Agricultural cooperatives and rural power structure in Bangladesh: a study of the Comilla Model by Karim, Manjur-E.
3"f
Agricultural cooperatives and rural power structure in Bangladesh/
a study of the comilla model
by
MANJUR-E-KARIM
B.S.S., University of Dhaka, 1980
MASTER'S THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Sociology, Anthropology, & Social Work
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1985
Approved by
/l.£a, c v A i.uliw-L
LD Aiisaa tmaaa
,Tf i
I1f5
K 37 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I Want to acknowledge the support and guidance given by Dr. Lei ah
Dushkin, who served as major professor of this research. Her steadfast
enthusiasm, helpful suggestions and positive comments are greatly
appreciated.
With equal gratitude, I thank Dr. Jan Flora and Dr. Janet Benson
for serving on my advisory commitee.
Loving thanks to Nasreen, my wife who put up with me through it
all.
CONTENTS
Chapter I INTRODUCTION
Differentiation in Rural Bangladesh
The Comilla Model
Definition of Terms
Method
Outline, Hypotheses, and Conclusion
Chapter II HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PEASANT DIFFERENTIATION
PRECOLONIAL AND COLONIAL PERIODS
Agrarian Economy in Precolonial Period
Permanent Settlement
Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885
AGRARIAN STRATIFICATION ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE
Landlords and Tenureholders
Rich Peasants
Middle Peasants
Poor Peasants
Landless Laborers
AGRARIAN CLASS RELATIONS AND POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM
RICH PEASANTS' DOMINATION SINCE 1947
Chapter III THE COMILLA MODEL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
RURAL DEVELOPMENT: COLONIAL MEASURES
Famine Commission
Control of Credit Abuse
Local Governments
IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE AND COLONIAL MEASURES
2
7
9
11
11
14
16
17
19
20
22
22
23
30
31
32
14
14
23
27
30
30
32
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN RURAL UtVLIOPMLiii
Community Development Approach
Community Development in East Pakistan
Rural Development Academy
THE COMILLA MODEL
Role of Akhter Hameed Khan
"Hypotheses"
Cooperatives
Chapter [V COOPERATIVES IN ACTION:MEMRERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP
LANDHOLDING AND COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP
COOPERATIVE LEADERSHIP
CONSEQUENCE OF RICH PEASANTS DOMINATION
Chapter V VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL MOBILIZATION
KINSHIP NETWORKS
Khana(Household) 60
Paribar (Family) 60
Ban (Homestead) 61
Gushti (Lineage) 61
Atmiya Svajan (Kinsmen) 64
TERRITORIAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Reyai (Homestead Cluster) 65
Samaj(Association) 65
FACTIONALISM AND CLIENTELISM
Factional i sm
Patron-Client Relationship 6c
Mobilization Patterns 69
STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGICAL DOMINATION
Values: Fate and Effort 70
Perpetuation through Religious Leadership
n l
34
40
4fi
49
52
54
59
59
64
80
82
Communication Flows 76
ROLE OF THE STATE
Nature of the State: A Theoretical Issue
Buraucratic Structure in the Rural Areas
Local Government Bodies 84
Economic Diversification 85
Relationship with State through Political Parties 86
ABSENCE OF PARTIES OF PROTEST 87
Communist Party (1919-1953) 89
Awami League gg
National Awami Party gg
Chapter VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 94
-in
REFERENCES
gg
MAPS, GRAPHS, AND TABLES
Map 1 Political Districts of Bangladesh 3
Map 2 Population Distribution in Bangladesh 4
Table 1 Distribution of Total Population and
Cooperative Membership by Farm Size
in Comilla Thana, 1969 50
Table 2 Landholding Pattern of Cooperative Members
in Village Mahajanpur, Comilla, 1978 5 ^
Table 3 Percentage Increase in Yield Per Acre by the
Size of Holding, Comilla, 1972
Table 5 Vertical and Horizontal Information Flow
in Goalgaon, Comilla, 1965
57
Table 4 Marraige Pattern in Five Villages in Dhaka
District, 1981 63
79
Bar Diagram 1 Vertical and Horizontal Information
Flow in Goalgaon, Comilla, 1965 78
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an attempt to explore and analyze the problem of agri-
cultural development strategy from a sociological point of view. Its central
assumption is that the micro level problems of individual development strategies
must be linked to macro level social structural relationships.
More than half the people of the world, nearly three guarters of the
less developing world (Asia and Pacific 70-85%, Africa 80-90%, Latin America
40-50%), live in rural areas, sustained chiefly by work on the land and
mutual services (Hunter, 1978, p.l). Thus, in these countries agriculture
provides the largest source not only of income but also of employment. In
addition, it is the predominant source of foreign exchange earnings. Economic
growth in this context is critically dependent upon a breakthrough in agricul-
ture.
From the colonial period onwards there has been a slowly growing effort
to improve agricultural technology and output and to increase incomes in
the rural sectors of these countries. However there is an increasing realization
among the researchers and the policy makers, especially since the sixtees, that
while modern inputs such as high yielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, pesti-
cides and water, if properly applied are capable of greatly increasing
agricultural production, the supply of inputs is not a sufficient condition
for realizing the full technological possibilities in a given society. The issue
of technological development is closely related to the problem of social
relations. Thus emphasis has been placed on the study of the dynamics of social
relations to comprehend the nature and the constraints of technological
application in a society. Light has been shed on the non-technical variables,
such as internal class composition, power structure, culture, ideology, formal
2and informal groupings, external linkages and so on. These
studies
have given rise to an increasing concern that, in many cases
the facilities
provided by the agricultural development strategies i>re being exploited
by a small section of the rural population, while the vast
majority
of the peasant agriculturalists are virtually untouched by these
policies.
As the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
maintains
A relative inequality in land distribution, a
system of tenancy that separated those cultivators
unfortunate enough to be tenants from most of the
benefits of their skill and labor, and concentration
of power in the village elite, all tended towards
the abuse of the existing measures and services
provided for agricul tural development(Pears,1979, 175).
The analytical structure of the present thesis is developed against
this backdrop. We will examine the relationship between the network of
structural relationships and agricultural development in a particular
area in Bangladesh. The strategy under question is the Comilla cooperative
Model, a rural development project begun in the late fifties to
develop the agricultural economy through effective participation by
small and marginal peasants which ended up being controlled by the
better-off farmers. The region of Bangladesh under study is the
"Dhaka-Comi 1 la belt". Its location, in the central Bangladesh, may
be seen in the accompanying maps (Map 1 and 2). The term refers not only
to a particular region but to a distinctive landholding pattern.
Differentiation in Rural Bangladesh
It is not unusual in the contemporary rural sociological and
anthropological literature to divide the peasant category into different
classes. It is, however, erroneous to assume that a universal
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5model of differentiation can be developed by examining the existing
peasant societies. Although peasant societies and cultures have some
similarities all over the world(Redf ield, 1956), there are some peculiarit-
ies in each peasant society which make it imperative to undertake concrete
analysis of the specific situations.
In the Dhaka-Comilla belt of Bangladesh, the small family farm
is the basic unit of production and social livelihood. The rural populat-
on density is extremely high(over 1700 per sq. mi.) and the average
size of landholding is only about 2.5 acres. Thus we would seem to have
an undifferentiated peasant zone of small freeholders in the heart
of the country. This interpretation, however, would be quite misleading.
As Bertocci had observed, "absolute smallness in farm size should not
obscure the importance of small difference in landownership and
associated economic activities associated with them, as these reflect
clear variations in class, status, life style and power" (Bertocci ,1972,
P. 37).
On the basis of such seemingly small but socially significant
differences, we may differentiate four distinct strata among the peasantry
of the Dhaka-Comilla belt. In the minifundist context of this region,
it is not the large landowners but the farmers able to earn a surplus
on their operations who dominate the rural economy. Farmers owning only
4.5 acres or more normally belong to this category. Small as their
surpluses are , in an economy charecterized by large amounts of subsistence
farming and landlessness , the surplus farmers have a distinct advantage
over the rest of the rural population. These farmers are in a oosition
to diversify into activities like rent of land, manipulation of market,
or moneyl ending, and thereby gain leverage over others. This leveraae
6is reinforced by other social, political, and economic relations.
Thus, it is the independent farmer who is defined as a "rich farmer"
in this thesis. Unlike Alavi 's'Yich farmer" , also called a "capitalist
farmer", his farming is not primarily based on the exploitation of
waqe labor. The rich peasnt prefers to do the farm work himself , along
with his family, except in the harvesting season, when the family
farms can not function without the help of the hired laborers.
The basic difference between a rich peasant and a middle peasant
lies in the dual role played by the latter. Although the middle peasant
is primarily an independent farmer, owning only 2.5 to 4.5 acres,
occassionally he has to do sharecropping, because of his unstable
economic position. The middle peasant produces a marketable surplus, but
the amount is so insignificant that he essentially remains a subsistence
farmer. Unlike the rich peasant, the middle peasant is never in a
position to exploit the labor of others.
The poor peasant also has a very small plot of his own, usually
less than 2.5 acres, but the principal means of subsistence is either
sharecropping or working on somebody else's land. Thus his class position
is close to that of a landless laborer.
Landless labor, the rural proletariet, is the most poverty sticken
stratum in the agricultural economy. In the harvesting seasons, its
members are solely dependent on working on somebody else's land. But.
since an all year around employment is not available, the landless
laborers in this particular region constitute a floating ooDulation which
moves back and forth from the rural areas to the urban centers
7and from one village to another in search of
work. Rootless and almost
permanently starved, they live on public work
programs(e.g.
,
food for work,
etc.), relief and sometime even begging during
the nonharvesting seasons.
The empirical description of these strata,
and the analysis of the
relations between the rich peasants and the other
strata.form major components
of the present thesis.
The Comilla Model
The "Comilla Model" is a pilot project initiated
in 1959 by the Academy
for Rural Development in Pakistan to develop
village cooperatives. The
project was limited initially to rural areas of Comilla
District. Certain
ideas about cooperation and the diffusion
of technological innovations were
to be tested in Comilla to determine their
effectiveness and applicability
to the former East Pakistan as a whole.
Ten years later, under the Integrated
Rural Bevelopment Program (IRDP), the
Comilla Model was extended to other dis-
tricts. After Bangladesh came into existence as
an independent nation state
at the end of 1971, it consider the Comilla
Model the "paradigm of agricultu-
ral development". By 1977-78 there were 25,
777 primary cooperatives in
250 thanas(Johnson,1974).
In its pilot phase, when it was first adopted,
the Comilla Model was aimed
at the small and, middle peasant strata
described above. The hooe was that
this could be accomplished through cooperatives
what they lacked the
resources to do alone. Yet, from the outset,
the architects of the Comilla
Model assumed that power relations among the
various strata of the peasant
economy was not their concern. Because of
this assumption, no systematic
8effort was made to transform the existing structural relationships.
Rather, we shall argue, the new wine of agricultural inputs was poured
into the old bottle of relationships. The cooperative model, theoretically
aimed at briging into being new social roles and new leadership groups
consonent with "modernization" in agriculture as well as other spheres
of rural life, was in fact built on the traditional vertically
structured system of the villages.
Of the twin goals of the Comilla Model, increasing agricultural
productivity and improving the lives of the rural poor, the former
thus met with more success than the latter. The production of
food and cash crops in the villages under the cooperative system
increased significantly, but it was mainly the larger rather than the
small farmers that were the beneficiaries of this. As had happened in
earlier experiments in India and Pakistan, eventually the better off
farmers took over the cooperatives. They were able to direct major
portions of the -agricultural inputs, e.g., loans, fertilizers, irrigation
water, and insecticides to themselves. Empirical studies indicate that
the majority of the rural poor have not been reached by the' development
programs. Indeed their conditions appear to have worsened.
Against the backdrop, I propose to analyze the rural power
-structure ana socio-economic relations with a view to answering two
interrelated and overlapping guestions: 1) How did a project theoretically
aimed at helping small and marginal farmers get
taken over by the larger
farmers' 2) In view of the increasing rural polarization
in the Dhaka-
Comilla belt, where landlessness is now approaching
40%, what is the
potential for horizontal mobilization of agrarian
protest in opposition to
the existing vertical mobilization pattern? If there
is no such
mobilization, why has it not occurred?
Definition of Terms
For a meaningful and scientific discussion
of the subject, it is
essential that the terminology used should be
unambiguous. Before we
proceed further, the precise meaning of some
terms, which are crucial to
this analysis, ought to be clarified. First,
the term "class".
Stratification on the basis of simple differences
in wealth, on a single
linear scale, is an inadequate basis on which to
distinguish classes. For
us. as already indicated in the discussion
of peasant differentiation,
class is a structural concept. Production
relations, which are also
inevitably power relations, form the major basis of the
class. A social
class is any aggregate of persons who
perform the same function in the
organization of production and share the concomitant
social power and power
interest.
A crucial question here is the extent to which
members of a class are
conscious of this interest and mobilized to pursue
it. In this regard.
Marx made a distinction between a "class-in-i tsel
f
"
(Klasse an sich) anc
"class-for-itself" (Klasse for sich). There is a conscious
collective will
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in the "class-for-itself" which is absent in the "class-in-i tself".
(Bendix & Lipset, 1966, p. 7). In other words, "class-in-itself" is based
on the criteria of relations of production. But in "class-for-itself",
class consciousness and assertation of class interest has developed to the
point of actural or potential class conflict. As already noted, one of our
research questions is the extent to which this has or has not happened on
the part of landless and marginal farmers.
I am also going to utilize the concepts of "vertical" and
"horizontal" mobilization as developed by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (1967,
pp. 17-29). Although the Rudolphs applied these terms to caste politics in
India, they derived them from the analyses of class mobilization in Europe.
The Rudolphs' define vertical mobilization as
"marshalling of political support by traditional
notables in local societies that are organized and
integrated by rank, mutual dependencce, and the
legitimacy of traditional authority. Notables reach
vertically down into such social systems by attaching
dependents and socially inferior groups to themselves
through their interests and deference. The community
of the locality defines the boundaries of the system and
contains its structural dimensions" (Ibid., p. 24).
Horizontal mobilization is defined as
the marshalling of popular political support by
class or community leaders and their specialized
organizations. Horizontal mobilization introduces
a new pattern of cleavage by challenging the
vertical solidarities and structures of traditional
societies" (Ibid, p. 25).
The existing social pattern in the Ohaka-Comi 1 la belt will be
analyzed as a 'vertical mobilization' pattern. The 'vertical mobilization'
pattern, as we will show, is reponsible for the rich peasants' domination
over the agricultural cooperatives and absence of protest from the rural
poor against the present system.
In the present vertical mobilization pattern, the rich peasants
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are conscious of their position and are materially and ideologically
capable of directing their activities to particular goals. So the rich
peasantry can be described as a 'class-for-itself
' . On the other hand,
because of the absence of this class consciousness among the middle and
poor peasants and the landless labours, they are not in a position to
actualize their class potentials. Thus they are virtually "classes in
themselves". In other words, in the vertical mobilization pattern, the
dominant class maintains an internal horizontal solidarity whereas the
dominated classes lack it.
Method
Because of time and opportunity constraints, I could not conduct
systematic anthropological fieldwork, although some informal, unstructured
interviews were made on my visit in the summer of 1983. The informative
and analytical structures of the thesis are largely based on the review of
existing literature. I owe a deep intellectual debt to these studies for
providing me the theoretical points of departure and empirical data bases
for this thesis.
Furthermore, my understanding of the subject is enriched by my
having grown up in Comilla town. In order to orient myself, I availed
myself of all chances to establish close contacts with peasants who were
working within the cooperative framework and those who were not.
Interviews with the social scientists who have done research in the area.
as well as officials working in development organizations helped me to
comprehend the complex milieu of peasant society in the region.
Outline, Hypotheses and Conclusion
In order to address the issues posed earlier, in ChaDter 2, I
will undertake a historical discussion of the emergence and summary of
12
differentiation within the peasant societies in Bangladesh, for it will
provide us with an understanding of the complex dynamics within this
society.
In Chapter 3, I will review the history of what has become the
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD), its organizational
structure, principal assumptions and the phases in the implementation of
the Comilla Model.
In Chapter 4 and 5, I will analyze the cooperatives in action.
Chapter 4 will focus on coop membership and leadership, and indicate the
extent to which the cooperatives are controlled by the rich peasants.
In Chapter 5, I wi 11 address my two major questions. The answers
to both questions must be sought in the same processes. In order to
explicate these processes, I will attempt to test the following hypotheses.
First, extended kinship links are important for class
consciousness and solidarity. Kinship can be perceived as a familiar
network of relationships through which specific, particular interests can
be related to universal sets of interests. Marriage patterns in rural
Bangladesh, which has a significant role in kinship extension, tend to
favor the rich peasants. The rich peasants are able to sustain kinship
links at a greater distance than the poorer families of their village,
although of course, local strategic marriages are also made for alliance
purposes.
Second, effective control over the territorial organizations is a
significant process through which the rich peasants maintain their
authority on the rural power structure.
Third, the prevalence of factional politics in the villages,
characterized by vertical cleavages dominated by rich peasants, hinders the
emergence of class solidarity among poor peasants and landless laoorers.
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Although factional rivalries exist among rich peasants, these are far less
damaging to their class solidarity than it is to that of their clients.
Fourth, the dominant ideology in the rual poor is a synthesis of
scriptual Islam, Anglo-Saxon property concepts and a set of traditional
values, e.g., kinship ethics, work morality, passivity. This ideology is
transmitted in the whole society through an informal institution of rural
priesthood and the rich peasants' control over the information flow. The
predominant mode of information flow in the rural society is essentially
vertical, which greatly inhibits horizontal communication among poorer
peasants.
Fifth, the present form of exploitation involves the state. The
state apparatus in Bangladesh is structurally biased towards classes which
are responsible for inequity and poverty because it depends on them for
suvival in its present form. So the state throws its support behind the
existing vertical mobilization pattern.
And finally, there is no political party in Bangladesh which both
expresses the needs of the rural poor and has roots among them. The
existing radical political parties have failed to provide a linkage between
the rural poor and national politics.
The analysis of these processes will lead to our conclusion
(Chapter 6) that in the cooperative, the poor peasantry will remain weak,
even if rich peasants are excluded, precisely because of their subordinate
position in other structures of dependence which constitute the greater
part of their lives. Therefore, the essential precondition for successful
cooperative strategy, which could reach the rural poor, is a positive
transforation in these other structures of domination.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PEASANT DIFFERENTIATION
PRE-COLONIAL AND COLONIAL PERIODS
Agrarian Economy in the PreColonial Period
This chapter will briefly discuss the historical development of the
structural differentiation pattern within contemporary peasant societies in
rural Bangladesh. In doing so, this chapter will focus on the background on
which the cooperative model was built.
There is a conventional view of pre-colonial Bengal that is widely shared;
that of a static 'traditional society 1 primarily rural and agricultural, founded
on self-contained corporate village communities bound down by the caste system
and engaged mainly in subsistance production, superimposed on which was a
parasitic state apparatus. That society lacked an endogenous dynamic for
development of market forces. It followed therefore that it was only the
shattering impact of colonialism that broke open that closed society and
generated new forces of change. This longstanding academic cliche can be
attributed to Charles T. Metcalfe, whose characterization of the precolonial
Indian village communities influenced the nineteenth century British writers
(Hollingberry,1979,p.28 ). Marx's view of the pre-colonial Indian economy and
society was not substantially different (Marx, 1960, p. 77).
A significant section of South Asian scholarship does not, however, share
the consensus among classical writers about a static backward and unresponsive
society and economy in precolonial Bengal. On the contrary, they recognize
some indication of market development and structural change in a society that
was still pre-capitalist.
Contrary to the conventional assumption of "communal ownership of land",
a concept of private proDerty existed even in precolonial Benaal . A class
of revenue collectors, the rural elite, emerged out of the tax farming system.
Evidence suggests that the society also contained elements of occupational
15
mobility. Marking this feature oi the uVvclopmciil of Bengal society,
Radhakawal Mukerjee says:
"Both in Bihar and Bengal, from the days of Muhaiwiadan
administration, there has been superimposi tion by the sta.e
of individualistic and capitalistic ideas of property. There
has bepn remarkable development of economic and juristic
institutions. While, on the one- hand, capitalistic farming
and landlordism superimposed by the state have overridden the
communal interests of the village system, on the other hand
Jimutavahana and others developed individualistic concepts of
property which dealt a serious blow to communal notions in
the
joint family and the coparcenary village community (Mukherjee.
1940, pp. 310-11).
H. T. Colebrooke says:
"These tenures (i.e., petty properties which are common
in the
eastern districts of Bengal) seem rather to have been an
extension of the rights of occupants, from vague
permanence to
a declared, hereditary, and even transferable interest.
They
would bear a fixed quit-rent for portions of land which
are to
be inherited in regular succession and some were
understood to
authorize the transfer by sale or donation, and consequently
conferred every right which constitute real property...
(Colebrooke, 1884, p. 55).
The existence of private property in the precolonial
period was also
observed by N.N.Gupta
The Bengal school of Law (flayabhaga),
expounded by Jimutavahana
between the 13th and 15th century A.D. has a basic conception
of property-right quite different from the community of joint
family rights which find expression in Mitakshara which prevails
in western provinces (Gupta, 1949, p. 1)
Karim (1980) maintains that M. N. Roy's description of the
development
of commercialized production in India can be applied to the case
of Bengal.
Roy observes—
"Although industrial production was still based on hereditary craf
manship accordinq to the caste system, another class had arisen
(by the middle of the Eighteenth century) which controlled the
distribution of the commodities produced by the guilds. The
hereditary artisans had ceased in many instances, to be
independent members of the autonomous village community. His
production was no longer the property of the. community to be
exchanged by himself into other necessities produced by equally
.
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independent members of the community. Arts and crafts, which
ago had arisen as a part of village economy within
the oonds of caste, had long ceased to be the exclusive concern
of the isolated villages..." (Roy, 1922, p. 98).
Existenceof a tax-collector rural elite class, the "zamindars", was
also evident in pre-colonial Bengal. The zamindars acted as intermediaries
between' the established authorities and the tillers of the soil. In peneral ,
they had been appointed by the Mughal authority to collect revenue from the
actual cultivators. They were "revenue fanners" whose interests were dis-
tinctly "different from those who themselves labored on land(Jannuzi .". "each,
1980, p.l). The zamindar not only collected revenue as the
subordinate
instrument of the larger system, but also was answerable for the
neace and
good order in the country(Sinha, 1956 ,0.3)
.
The Permanent Settlement
However, despite the impetus for capital ist transformation, a full fledged
market economy did not come into being in rural Bengal until the Permanent
Settlement, the most significant legal framework of landed property in Bengal,
laid down by the British colonial authority. The Permanent Settlement Act,
promulgamated in 1793, brought about two major structural changes in the
agrarian economy of Bengal.
1. The class of tax-collector intermediaries were made the owners of
the land.
2. Actual tillers' rights on land were ignored. The peasants were
now classified as "tenants" of the zamindar ( Jannuzi & Peach, 1980).
In its intellectual origin, this settlement was based on a physiocratic belief
that a capitalist landowning class on the model of the English squirarchy could
be produced in the richly endowed and prosperous province of Bengal (Gupt:.
,
1963, p. 74).
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The complex patterns that emerged cannot easily be summarized here.
But what was common to the whole process was the fact that access of the
colonial state apparatus and the landowning class to the surplus produced by
the peasant was not dependent on the exercise and organization of direct
coercive force, typical of feudalism, but on the institution of property
right by the colonial regime and the concomitant dispossession of the peasant.
The peasant was rather subject to economic coercion, the economic law of
capitalism. Appropriation of land either by the state (the state appropriated
those lands which did not go under the "zamindari" ownership) or by the
individual owners, combined with population growth, prevented the peasants
from leaving a landlord's property and moving elsewhere. In theory, the
peasant was not subject to feudal obligations. He was "free" - free, indeed
to work for a landowner, his only means of access to land, or to starve
(Alavi,1980,p. 24).
However, with the cumulative effect of commercialization and rapidly
increased pressure of population growth, it soon became apparent that
uncontrolled high landlordism would have serious consequences. In particular,
the Pabna revolt of 1873 showed clearly that it is imperative for the
colonial state to define more precisely, perhaps redefine, the legal
framework of property relationships ( Chatterjee,19C3, p. 2-4).
Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885
Periodically during the nineteenth century, British authority intervened
to establish regulations to give some concessions to the actual tillers. As
early as 1859, for example, it was established that cultivators who tilled the
same lands for twelve years could be accorded "occupancy rights" to those
lands, subject of course to the faithful payment of rent to their zamindars.
But the British continued to be unsuccessful in enforcing such provisions,
18
and the rights of the cultivating peasantry of the region also continued to
deteriorate.
Finally, in 1885, the British made a major attempt to establish a
revised landlord-tenant relation in the region. In that year, the Bengal
Tenancy Act came into force (Jannuzi &Peach, 1980, p. 3). whereas the
Permanent Settlement of 1793 tended to ignore the full spectrum of customary
rights in land and to confer proprietary rights to zamindars, the Bengal
Tenancy Act of 1885 gave de jure recognition to the rights of others besides
zamindars in the agrarian hierarchy. It gave legal substance to the rights,
as well as the responsibilities, of those whose status had not been recognized
by the Permanent Settlement. It established the basis for all subsequent
legislation (even in contemprary Bangladesh) governing the relationships of
people to the land in this region.
AGRARIAN STRATIFICATION ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE
The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, as amended, presented a version of the
intricately stratified system of rights in land in the region that is now
Bangladesh. At the apex of the hierarchy was the ruling authority, the
Provincial government of Bengal. Below the Provincial government were the
zamindars, tenure-holders, and under-tenure-holders (those who had rent-
collecting powers). In descending order there were different kinds of
raiyats*, i.e., occupancy raiyat (a rent-paying holder of land having the
right of occupancy on the land held by him), non-occupancy raiyat (a rent-
paying holder of land not having the right of occupancy to land in his
* Raiyat is legally defined as a person who has acquired from proprietor
or from another tenure holder a right to hold land for the purpose of
cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family or by hired
servants or with the aids of partners, etc.
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possession) and the under-raiyat (a rent-paying holder of land having
temporary possession of a holding under a raiyat). At the base were landless
laborers whose rights in land were either tenous or nonexistent (
Ibid, pp. 4-9)
.
We will discuss each of these strata on the eve of independence in 1947.
Landlords and Tenure Holders
Zamindars, the landlords, used to enjoy the dual prerogatives of land-
owners and rent collectors. The whole system of rent-collecting
was charac-
terized by an unlimited degree of corruption. In 1900, the total
amount of
government revenue in East Bengal was taka 39,000,000, but
according to the
report of the revenue board, the zamindars collected taka 165,000,000
(Siddique, 1981, p. 15). It means the tenants had to pay more than 400%
of the
legally due revenue. Although a significant portion of this
money went to the
intermediaries, the figure illustrates the exploitative nature
of the landlord
dominated economy. From 1793 to 1933, approximately taka 180,000,000,000
was
appropriated by the zamindars by illegal means (Mukherjee, 1933, p. 34).
In
1937, in the second session of the Bengal Parliament, three
members showed the
amount of revenue collected by the zamindars as follows -
taka 290 million
(legally taka 170 million and illegally taka 120 million), taka 300
million
(legally taka 200 million and illegally taka 100 million) and taka 260
million
(legally taka 200 million and illegally taka 60 million) (Siddique, 1980, p.
15).
Sources of this information was not documented, but there are
substantial
reasons to believe that these reports were something more than
sheer political
rhetoric. On top of the land revenues, there were marriage
taxes, penalty for
social delinquency, and business tolls and taxes. Taxeswere imposed
in cases of
marriages and funerals in the zamindar family, or when the zamindar
was to buy
* Taka is the Bangladeshi currency. According to the
government rate, one U.
S
* laa n /- > However, since the dollar has a
dol ar was equivalent to twenty taka in woe.
ru c
•
,
ti n of tt>e
different purchasing power in different economies,
a direct transla o r
dollar into taka is not a good indicator of its
real value.
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a new car or horse (Ibid). Although the colonial authority outlawed this kind
of tax imposition in 1859, 1885, and 1893, and a new law was promulgated in
1937, this illegal practice continued. It might sound amazinq to a
western
observer, but it's true that there was not a single instance of legal action taken
by colonial authority against the zamindars in this regard f Ibid, p. 19).
The surplus capital accumulated by the zamindars was mainly spent in non-
productive sectors, such as feasting,, maintaining concubines, consumption of
luxuries , and building mansions in Calcutta and
other district towns.
Thus, a significant amount of the surplus capital which could be invested in
agricultural or industrial sectors, was wasted (Ibid, p. 20).
In the agrarian hierarchy, the tenure holders were next to the zamindars.
They had acquired from a proprietor or from another tenure-holder a right to
hold land for the purpose of collecting rents or bringing the land under
cultivation by establishing tenants on it. In fact, it was not the absentee
landlord who was in a position to oppress the peasant from day to day. It was
these tenure holders who used to make constant demands on the peasants and
oppress them directly.
Rich Peasants
This class started gaining strength from the second half of the nineteenth
century. Emergence of this class as a strong social stratum must be seen in the
context of an agrarian economy increasingly dominated by the fact of
commercialization. It was the gradual subsumption of peasant production to
market economy that brought into operation the familiar process of indebtedness
leading to increasing control by the creditor over the
surolus product of. the
small producer, leading in turn to the transfer of the small peasant's land.
There was a steady increase in both sales and mortgages of smal 1 -peasant
holdings in Bengal from the late nineteenth century, especially in the southern
and south-western part of the province. These rates of increase picked up
substantially in the years following the depression in the early 1930s, and
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outright sales of small holdings increased dramatically after the free trans-
ferability of raiyati holdings was legally recognized by the new Tenancy Act
Amendment in 1939 (Chowdhury, 1976, pp. 105-165), (Chatherjee 1982, pp. 113-224).
The creditors to whom the land passed were typically the rich peasants,
the "jotedars", who also engaged in money lending and grain trading, and often
also in small agricultural processing industries, such as rice mills (Ghosh
& Dutt, 1977, pp. 59-87). Typically, once again, the transferred land would
be cultivated by the dispossessed small peasant, but now on a hal f-share-of-
produce rent and with no legal rights of tenancy. The phenomenon of what has
been called "depeasantisation" (Chowdhury, 1976) mostly occurred in the
western and southwestern regions of Bengal. In the northern districts, in
particular, the existence of jute crop production sustained the viability of
small-peasant subsistence production much longer than elsewhere. It was only
after the depression of the early 1930s that the fragility of small -peasant
production was finally exposed in northern Bengal (Karim, 1980, p. 95).
In the eastern zone of the country where the Dhaka-Comilla belt is
situated, a strong kulakism never got off the ground in the pre-partition period.
Even at the present time, the rich peasants in the Dhaka-Comilla belt are much
weaker than their southern, south-western and northern counterparts. However,
this relative weakness, as I will show later, doesnot blur the crude reality of
inequality in this area. The historical underdevelopment of the capitalist
rich farmers in the Dhaka-Comilla belt can be partly attributed to the nature
of landlordism in this region. In this area, moneylending ana trading in
agricultural produce was tied with landlordism into a single network. This was
quite different from the typical "jotedari" form, where rich peasants
would extend their effective control over the land of small peasant-share-
croppers by using a combination of debt-bondage and extra economic coercion
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(Bose, 1982, pp. 463-92). In eastern Bengal, usurious and commercial exploita-
tion of the peasantry was generally perceived as linked inseparably with
zamindari exploitation.
The Middle Peasants
A large portion of the occupancy raiyats constituted the middle peasantry,
the next layer in the agrarian hierarchy. Besides cultivating their own lands,
the middle peasants occasionally sharecropped on the landlords' or rich
peasants' land. The middle peasants' relationship with the market was a
fluctuating one. Although they had a profit motivated rationale for production,
most of the time their production output was exhausted after meeting the family
requirements. The middle peasants' class aspiration was rather ambiguous. They
had the ambition of becoming rich peasants, but at the same time they were aware
of the fact that flood, famine, and bad harvesting could make pauperization
inevitable for them. By and large, the middle peasants were subject to
increased marginalization. In order to meet emergencies, they used to borrow
money from the rich peasants and when they failed to repay the debt, lost their
occupancy rights on land. In 1945, 27.8% of the total cultivating population
in the Dhaka-Comilla belt belonged to this category (Reza, 1982, p. 17).
The Poor Peasants
Cultivating on fragmented and scattered lands, proportionately the poor
peasants used to pay more tax than the rich and the middle peasant. But their
occupancy rights were even less secured than the middle peasants. Since
their lands were far from sufficient to meet their economic requirements, they
sharecropped, even worked as agricultural laborers. Their debts to the rich
peasants were greater than those of the middle peasants. Their production
rationale was essentially a subsistence one. So far as class position and
aspiration were concerned, they resembled the landless laborers more than other
co-peasants. In 1945, 20.8% of the peasants in the Dhaka-Comilla belt were
poor peasants of this kind (Ibid).
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This was the class of agrarian proletariat who didn't have anything to
fall back on except their labor power. Most of them even didn't have a cow
and plough, essential for sharecropping (Siddique, 1981, pp. 19-23).
According to the Flood Commission Report in 1933-39, 18.6 percent of the total
cultivating population in Bengal lived either mostly or absolutely on selling
its labor power (Report of the Land Revenue Commission, Vol. VI, 1940, p. 117).
Ishaque found in 1944-45 that 29.9 percent of the total cultivating families were
landless (Ishaque, 1944-45, pp. 122-33). Reza found that 18.1 percent of the
peasant population in the Dhaka-Comilla belt was landless in 1945 (Reza, 1982,
p. 36).
AGRARIAN CLASS RELATIONS AND POLITICS OF COMMUNALISM
To comprehend the nature of agrarian class structure in pre-partition
Bengal properly, one has to take the peculiar communo-economic pattern of the
agrarian economy of East Bengal in consideration. An almost universally
accepted feature of the agrarian structure is eastern Bengal was its pre-
dominantly upper-caste Hindu landlord class (Chatterjee, 1983, p. 16).*
* The Permanent Settlement Act is usually held responsible for the dominance
of the Hindus in the agrarian economy. However, there are two schools of
opinion on the impact of the Permanent Settlement Act on the Hindus and the
Muslims. The first school, following William Hunter, maintains that since
the Muslims were in political power in the pre-British period, the British
deliberately patronized the Hindus and deprived the Muslims (See Quereshi
,
1962, pp 212-224 , and Mullick, 1S61, pp. 27-65). The second school, on
the other hand, argues that a) the Hindus controlled most of the economic
activities in Bengal even long before the British came. So the question
of being biased to them is irrelevent. b) the British overthrew the
Muslim military bureaucracy in Bengal. This buraucracy had a distant
relationship with land (See Sen, 1976).
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True, there were many members of Hindu landlord families whose principal
incomes were no longer from rent, but from white-collar employment or the
professions. But nonetheless, analysis of the situation points to the
significant fact that the urban Hindu "bhadralok" were closely associated
with landlordism (Siddique, 1981, p. 24). As a class, the Bengali urban
middle class came into being as a result of the Permanent Settlement Act. The
surplus created from the agrarian economy enabled the sons of the rural elite
to bear the expenses of English education. In colonial Bengal, English
education was the key to enter the emerging urban professional and service-
holder class. Since there was hardly any opportunity to invest in any other
productive sector, their income was mostly spent in buying land. This
investment pattern reinforced the urban middle class' ties with landlordism
which prevented them from taking an independent class stance. While most of
the bigger and more powerful landlords were Hindu, most of the peasants
belonged to the Muslim community.
Many Muslim rent.-recievers, although they had let much of their lands,
often continued to cultivate some of the lands and remained culturally a part
of the peasant community. Therefore, the cultural pattern of landlord dominance
in the region was reinforced and demonstrated in terms of upper-caste Hindu
superiority over the predominatly Muslim peasantry. The Muslim peasantry
developed a grievance against the Hindu landlords not only for economic
reasons but also because of the social stigma they experienced from the
pollution of the predominant Hindu cul ture(Ahmed, 1969, p. 163).
Politically, the peasant grievance did not only take the form of an
organized peasant movement. Particularly in the crucial period of 1926-31, it
erupted in a series of violent communal clashes against Hindu landlords and
moneylenders (Chatterjee, 1983, p. 22). The evidence on these riots suggests
quite clearly the more or less general character of the Muslim peasant's
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resistance. Ideologically, the participants saw themselves as resisting the
unjust domination and exploitation of a peasant community by external enemies.
The lines of division were clear in cultural terms: peasants resistance took
the forms of acts of defiance against the targets that symbolized the wealth
and power of the dominant classes. Besides plunder and destruction of property,
there occurred widespread disobedience of "customary" cultural practices at
religious festivals patronized by Hindu landlords and trading groups, desecra-
tion of idols worshipped in landlord households, and the almost ritualized
burning of bonds and records of loans. The armed strength of landlords, on
the other hand, was organized by Hindu zamindars, traders and professionals
living in the district towns of the region, with open political support from the
Hindu Mahasabha and various quasi -political Hindu religious organizations.
The National Congress, an ostensibly secular political
party, tended to
represent the interests of the Hindu landlords. On the other hand, the Muslim
League and the Krishak Praja Samity, two major Muslim political organizations,
supported the peasants' causes. Despite the upper class and middle class
leadership structures of both of these parties, they supported the pro-peasant
issues mainly for four reasons. In the first place, since it was the Hindus
who mostly constituted the landlord class, the Muslim organizations felt less
socio-economic obligations to identify themselves with the landed status quo.
Even the distinguished "Nababs" of Dhaka, who earned this title by offering
unconditional support to the colonial government in the second half of the
nineteenth century and later played a pioneering role in establishing the Muslim
League, had major stakes in trade and commerce, not in land (Karim, 1932, p. 136).
Secondly, since it was the rich Muslim peasants, who provided the principal
support base for both of these parties, they felt obliged to manifest their
anti-big landlord sentiments (Ibid). Thirdly, since it was the vast multitude
of the Muslim peasantry who constituted the electoral constituencies
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for the Muslim politicians, under the system of separate electorates, it was
not possible for them to act against Muslim popular causes (Siddh|ui;, 1°>:1 ,;>.?* )
.
Final ly, evidence shows that the populists in the lower level organizations
of these parties were exerting pressure on the leadership structure to
uphold peasant causes(Umar,1974 ,pp. 124-129).
The political mobilization along class-communal line was clearly
demonstrated at the time of the passing of the 1928 amendment to the Tenancy
Act when the Congress-Swarajya Party in the legislative assembly unequivocally
supported the rights and privileges of landlords against every attempt to voice
the demands of peasants (Chatterjee, 1983, p. 22). On the other hand, both the
Muslim League and the Praja Samity supported the peasants' demands (Siddique,1981,
p. 24). When the Floud Commission interviewed the district bar associations,
dominated by the Hindu urban middle class, about the justification of the
Permanent Settlement, almosi all the associations supported the existing
system(Ibid). In 1937, Krishak-Praja Samity included in its election manifesto
a number of pro-peasant issues, such as abolition of landlordism, tax reduction
and establishment of a Debt Settlement Board (Ahmed, 1954, p. 39). In 1946,
the Muslim League, in its election manifesto, oromised to abolish landlordism
without. compensating the landlords(Reza, 1981, p. 47).
Muslim League's manifesto found unprecedented suooort and enthusiasm
among the Muslim peasants which brought a landslide victory for Muslim
League in East Bengal. The idea of "Pakistan", the conceot of establishinn
a seoarate state for the Muslims of the subcontinent, advocated bv the ''uslim
Leaoue, provided hone for the Muslim oeasants to oet rid of the exnloitative
economic relationship they suffered from.
This, therefore, was the context in which peasant resistance to landlord
domination and usurious exploitation in eastern Bengal became communal. The
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anrarian structure, tonether with a snecifi'c denooraohic distribution, set the
stage for this political possibility. The particular cultural torn: of landlordism,
and that of a peasant-communal resistance to landlord authority, then determined
the specific political articulation of this Struggle in the form of a "communal"
confl ict.
RICH PEASANTS' DOMINATION SINCE 19"7
After Pakistan came into existence, the East Bengal State Acquisition and
Tenancy Act of 1885 was abolished. The Act of 1950, as amended and supple-
mented by Presidential ordinance, contains the principal provisions of the law
affecting the hierarchy of rights in land in contemporary Bangladesh.
The Act was designed to abolish the right of rent-receivers to act in
behalf of the state in the collection of land revenue, i.e. to bring the state
into a direct de jure relationship with rent-paying cultivators of land. By
suggesting that the former rent-receiving intermediaries (zamindars) would not
be permitted to retain their rkhas lands (lands that were not sublet, but
occupied directly) the Act of 1950 seems not only to repeal the Bengal
Tenancy Act of 1885, but also to invalidate the Permanent Settlement Act of
1793. Abolition of rent-recievinq bin landlordism, coupled with the
migration of the Hindu landlords to India en bloc, left the rich peasants
with an opportunity to become dominant in the agrarian economy. However,
the strength and the size of the rich peasants significantly varied from one
region to another. In the northern and south-western part of the country,
extensive concentration of land gave rise to a capitalist production
relationship (a relationship between capital ana wage,, in the Dhaka-Comilla
belt the landlord dominated economy was replaced by a peasant mode of
production. Like the previous economic pattern, the present one was also
patronized by the state apparatus. Contrary to Chayanov's (1966) generalization
28
of "peasent economy", the present system, although basically structured on
family farms, was marked by sharp differentiation.
In context of the near zero-sum game, a survival economy of small
peasants resulted, coupled with a rich peasant surplus economy. The survival
economy concentrated on food grains whereas the surplus economy developed
cash crops.
This meant increasing marginal ization and pauperization for the poor
peasants. The National census of 1961 revealed that landless agricultural
laborers increased by 63% in the decade of 1951 to 1961. In the same period,
the total peasant population increased by only 32.59% (Government of
Pakistan, 1961, Vol.1). The rate of increase of the landless poor was therefore
far greater than that for other rural classes.
From their economic bases, the rich peasants slipped into the power
vacuum left by the Hindu landlords. Their dominance in rural politics is
evident from the following data. Out of 392 Union Councillors (Local Govern-
mental Institution) elected in 1961, more than 60% owned more than five acres.
Among them, 42 held 15.5 or more acres and only 2.3% held less than 2.5 acres.
(Rashiduzzaman , 1968). However, the diseqilibrium in land-human ratio, rudi-
mentary technology and low level of overall capital accumulation put constr-
aints on a rich peasant's -aspiration of becoming a landlord.
One important aspect of rich peasants' domination and his relationship
with the post-colonial state apparatus ought to be kept in mind. Since 1960
the government's main concern was to increase the marketed surplus. So,
emphasis was placed on technology-oriented agricultural development, with
government provision of new agricultural and physical inputs and credit.
The nature and the development of the Comilla Model cannot be comprehended
without a proper understanding of this background. Chapter
III will discu
the institutional development of the Comilla aoproach, again
with
cuss
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special reference to the historical growth of rural development stratenies
in this part of South Asia.
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CHAPTER III
THE COMILLA MODEL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter includes discussion of the
organizational development, ,
assumptions, and organizational expansion of the Comilla Cooperative
Model.
But before that a historical description of rural development
measures
in Bengal is also endeavored. The Comilla Cooperative Model was
not an isolated
historical event. Rather it was a part of a gradually evolving
historical
process which had been initiated and supervised by the the
administrative
structures, both colonial and postcolonial .
RURAL DEVEL0PMENT:C0L0NIAL MEASURES
Government concern over rural development in South Asia can be
traced
back to the late nineteenth century, when the colonial government
adopted
three important measures to analyze and solve rural problems.
Famine Commission
The government appointed several commissions, including a royal
inquiry
commission, to identify the causes of famine, which occured at frequent
intervals, devastated whole regions and generated enormous human
misery.
Instead of pointing out the consequences of colonial intrusion
in the tradi-
tional economy, the inquiry commissions usually concluded that
famine was a
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natural Asian phenomenon, partly due to the climate and partly due to bad
farming, which could not be prevented except in a few regions where irrigation
canals could be built. In other regions, only its shock could be lessened by
means of quick transportation of food supplies by railways and roads.
Subsequently, a famine code was prepared which described, in minute
detail, when and how the dole should be distributed to save the disabled
from starvation, how to organize public works at "test" (extremely low)
wages for unemployed peasants, and how to advance loans to the landowners
for the next cultivation. The famine code was loudly advertised as one of
the imperial achievements, unprecendented in Indian or Asian history. It
was claimed, on the basis of rather dubious statistics, that under British
rule very few villagers died of starvation. More deaths, of course, were
caused by malnutrition or disease (Khan, 1978, p. 36).
Famines however, continued to occur with disturbing frequency, except
in regions where the necessary investment was made for the control of floods
and drought. In one of the very last years of the colonial rule (1943) the
Bengal famine occurred, one of the greatest man-made famines in Indian
History (Bhatia, 1963, p. 21).
Control of Credit Abuse
Landlords were not the only proteges who were abusing the powers
acquired by them under colonial rule; merchants and money lenders were
doing the same. Trade and usury hurt the peasant proprietors to such an
extent that their desperation at last attracted the attention of district
officers. They discovered that low prices and high interest charges were
bankrupting the peasants at an alarming rate. Many of them were losing
their lands. The colonial administration saw the potential for large scale
rural unrest in this trend. Although laissez-faire was the predominant
ideological overtone of colonial capitalism, attempts were made to reduce
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usury and regulate money lenders. However, under the prevailing circum-
stances, the lenders still had wealth and prestige, while the borrowers were
needy and helpless. Regulations were enacted, but rarely enforced.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, measures were adopted by some
government officials to organize the peasantry into cooperative societies
modeled after the German credit unions. It was hoped that in this way they
would be able to protect themselves from the excesses of merchant money-
lenders, just as the German farmers had done a generation earlier. During
the abnormal agricultural boom of World War I, village cooperatives flourished
briefly, but the following slump soon made them insolvent "banks of the
bankrupts." The post World War I period found peasant indebtedness growing
inexorably, not much affected by regulations of usury or by credit and
marketing cooperatives (Khan, 1978, pp. 7-8).
Local Governments
Another safeguard against the dangers of rural disaffection was the
Anglo-Saxon concept of local government. It was hoped that local councils
would radiate feelings of participation, banish apathy, and encourage local
initiative. Furthermore, beginning logically at the bottom, training in
local self-government would gradually upgrade the Indians for national
independence. But in practice, the concept of decentralization and autonomy
could not be reconciled with the dominant colonial attitudes which were
centralist, elitist, and paternalistic. Decade after decade, cooperatives or
"panchayats" (local councils) remained not as functional parts of the steel
frame but as its trim (Khan, 1978, pp. 8-9).
IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND COLONIAL RESPONSE
The nineteenth century colonial rural development measures were based
on three axioms — the superiority of the British, the benevolence of colonial
occupation, and the right of white men to be the guardians of the natives.
wa
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The new nationalist ideology in the twentieth century challenged
every one of
these axioms. There was no superiority; there was no benevolence;
and there
s no right of guardianship. On the contrary, there was
the inalienable
right of self determination. The nationalist challenge was
reinforced by
Gandhi, who provided a link between powerful sections of the
domestic
bourgeoisie and the peasantry through the doctrine of nonviolence,
trusteeship,
and the glorification of the Indian village community (Moore, 1966, p.
316).
Right after World War I , a socialist ideology emerged in
South Asia. The
Communist Party of India was established in 1919 under the
leadership of
M. N. Roy, a Bengali Intellectual acti vist(Talukdar, 1982, p. 49).
The appeal
of nationalism and socialism was greatly enhanced by the rise of non-European
Japan and the success of the Russian revolution (Talukdar, 198?, p. 73).
In order to respond to the new challenges — political, economic,
and
moral — the colonial administrators evolved a comprehensive ideology
of
rural reconstruction, which was persistently propagated in the turbulent
third and fourth decades of our century. In South Asia, F. L.
Brayne, a
self-styled Socrates of the South Asian villages, was the most famous
propounder of this philosophy.
Brayne (1940) admitted that village conditions were indeed miserable.
He agreed with the nationalists about the facts of misery but not
about
their causes. According to Brayne, the deplorable rural conditions
were not
the consequence of the colonial system, as the nationalists or
socialists
suggested. These were rather due mainly to their own ignorance and
:ad
habits, their folly and vices. Indeed, "they were their own
enemies." he
claimed. Brayne compiled a lono list of their short-cominqs-lazy
farming,
burning precious cow dung, addiction to the hubble-hubble
(The Hookah), poor
hygiene, litigation, costly death and marriage feasts, female
illiteracy, etc.
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Brayne, having diagnosed the disease, prescribed the cure. Peasants could
improve their lives by acquiring knowledge and reforming vicious habits,
learning and practicing better methods of agriculture, health, education, and
social conduct. Brayne assigned a new role to the government officer, viz
to be the missionary of enlightenment and reform. Contrary to the popular
sterotype of an arrogant and corrupt bully, the officer was to convert himself
into a guide, philosopher, and friend of the villagers. He was also to
inspire the loyal old collaborators, members of the gentry, to mend their
ways and give a proper lead to the commoners (Brayne, 1946).
AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Direct colonialism came to an end in several Asian and African countries
after World War II. The post-colonial period was characterized by new
ideologies of rural development. The new ideologies, however, were related
to the developments in international politics as the world powers, the U.S.A.
and the U.S.S.R., competed with each other for political, economic and
ideological superiority (McGrath, 1974, pp. 203-11). West Germany and Japan
were rehabilitated by the United States so that their prosperity and
progress might serve as bulwarks against revolutions. The Marshall Plan,
for the revival of West Europe, was regarded as a shining success. It seemed
obvious that a helping hand could be extended in the same manner to the
poorer countries of the world and American aid could stabilize ex-colonial
states as it had stabilized Western Europe and Japan. Hence, aid programs
were started all around the world under Truman's "Point Four" program.
Apart from military aid, material aid was given in the shape of loans,
grants, capital, and consumer goods. Technical aid was provided in the form
of experts, advisors, and foreign training. And ideological "aid" flowed in
through the dissemination of orthodox economic and sociological wisdom. In
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the 1950s rulers of many penurious states regarded America hopefully as a
good fairy and foreign aid as a magic wand (Rogal , 1959, pp. 65-93).
Community Development Approach
Two major rural programs were sponsored by the United States during
the 1950's, community development (CD) and agricultural extension (AE). The
former was newly fashioned by American sociologists, while the latter was
an old product of the American land-grant colleges. Both CD and AE were
generously supported and carefully supervised by American advisors. CD
promised political peace by including everyone in the harmonious community
and putting an end to rural conflicts. It promised economic prosperity by
inculcating the desire for development and by securing common participation.
As an ideological weapon of the cold war, CD offered the prospect of
consensus as an alternative to radicalism (Khan ,1978.
.pp. 16-17) -
The Community Development Approach relied mainly on a government
village-level worker (VLW) as the agent of change. Sending a missionary
outsider was considered essential in every case. The VLW, like Brayne's
guide, was advised to collaborate closely with the local gentry, the
established or "natural" leaders. Ideally, the VLW came to help everybody
not by fighting for the weak against the strong, but by uniting all of them
into a fraternal community. The VLW, acting as a catalyst, would unite the
villagers by discovering for them their common needs. He would lead them
to a common endeavor. He would teach them to form councils and committees
for the completion of projects. Much, of course, would be done by means of
self-help, as Brayne had proposed before, but, now and then, the VLW would
further encourage and stimulate the villagers by obtaining for them matching
grants and technical assistance. The VLW would be a multi-purpose agent
representing all "nation-building" departments. He would combine the
functions of a missionary, organizer, technician, and patron. Community
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development aspired to coordinate the activities of other departments, and
follow an integrated approach(Khan, 1978, pp. 18-19).
Commun ity Development i n East Paki Stan
Initially, the American community development approach dominated the
scene, as far as rural development is concerned in East and West Pakistan.
The first significant community development program in Pakistan was Village-
Aid (V-AID). The program was set up in 1953. The V-AID workers were trained
in especially created training institutes in both East and West Pakistan
(Raper, 1970, p. 22).
V-Aid soon proved inadequate. By the mid-fifties, food shortages and
the quite obvious stagnation of the agricultural sector became a continuous
concern for Pakistan, as well as other developing countries. Backward rural
areas, at a time when the countries were engaged in a program of
industrialization, were indeed critically dangerous. In the first place, a
lot more food was needed for the cities, and continued shortage and high
food prices could threaten the whole governmental structure. And secondly,
if more food had to be imported, then all the other programs of industriali-
zation and import of capital goods would be upset (Talukdar, 1982, pp. 156-161).
One of the reasons the military junta gave to justify its overthrowing
of the civilian government in 1958 was the large scale food shortage (Martin,
1975, p. 36). The community development approach became a scapegoat for this
failure. The attack is/egan in 1957-1958 and came from three quarters. First,
the older bureaucratic deoartments censured the community development program
since it appeared to be a threat to its stereotypical experience and
unquestioned authority to deal with the developmental issue. Secondly, the
economic planners were disillusioned. At first they had gone along, with some
misgivings, but toward the end of the decade, they had the convictions that
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the community development should be rectified. They maintained that the
whole program had missed the point and had become a program of social welfare,
not of increasing production. Finally, the most vocal and stinging attack
came from the agricultural specialists. The "nation-building" departments
said that they were being hamstrung, that they were being unable to work
effectively on account of this community development approach and structure.
Agricultural experts further maintained that the community development
approach could not make any headway with the farmers, simply because of the
poorly-trained, multi-purpose, village-level worker (Khan, 1969, pp. 7-8).
The disillusionment over the community development approach was wide-
spread in many of the developing countries. By the end of the fifties, the
great hopes and enthusiasm which were aroused by community development
seemed to fade away and several countries dropped the name, while others
changed the content and emphasis of the program. Now the emphasis was on
institutional and legal bodies, on administrative reform, on local government
bodies and on cooperatives. There was much greater emphasis on integration
with the administrative structure, and there was more and more emphasis on
agricultural productivity.
Rural Development Academy
In Pakistan, the government opted for reorganizing the community
development approach by shifting emphasis. Stress was placed on the need
for training of the higher level officials responsible for the policies and
general administrative supervision of the program and of others associated
with it. It was at this point in the evaluation of the V-AID program that
the highest officials of the government of Pakistan began to formulate plans
for meeting this deficiency and called for advice upon the United States
advisors to the V-AID program and on the officials of the Ford Foundation
( Raper, 1970, p. 22).
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The sequence of steps which led to the establishment of the Academy for
Rural Development began at a meeting of high officials of the Pakistan
government in January, 1955. The working paper of the meeting stated:
"For some time the Village-Aid Administration has felt the
necessity of establishing training Academies not only for the
higher level administrative staff in project development areas
but also for training and for reorienting the provincial
extention staff of the nation-buildina departments as would be
operating within the tahsils In which Villaqe- Aid Development
areas are located it is necessary to train fresh batches
Of Civil Service of Pakistan and Provincial Service officers
for atleast a period of six months at these Academies and
subsequently to get a selected few of them to assume charae of
Project Development areas for a period of say one year (Pakistan
Project Files, 1955, p. 83).
The curriculam of the academies was to include provision of information
about administration of the various levels in each of the provinces. Special
attention was to be given to the effective use technological
available to the tahsil and thana* level which would include training in such
subjects as cooperatives, agricultural credit, financing, budgeting, social
welfare, economics- with special emphasis on rural economics- role of cottage
industries, home economics, and so on.
* An administrative unit in Bangladesh and the then East Pakistan.
Roughly equivalent to the American County. Recently, the present
Bangladesh government named the thana as sub-districts.
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These basic ideas were accepted by the prime minister in October 1955,
after consultation with the representative of the Ford Foundation in Pakistan
on the possibility of external funding of some of the costs anticipated for
the first few years. The government decided among other things to obtain the
assistance of an American university to help with the further planning of the
Academies and to provide continuing advisory assistance in the development of
the Academy's programs. The services of Michigan State University were
enlisted for this purpose, with the Ford Foundation financing (Raper, 1970),
p. 24-25).
In June 1956 a team of four faculty members, under the leadership of
Professor Floyd W. Reeves, after intensive observations and consultations
throughout Pakistan, prepared a draft "scheme" for submission to the
government. The proposal provided for establishment of two Academies with
substantially the same functions previously approved by the government. They
were to be set up under a single board chaired by the prime minister and made
up of ranking ministers and representatives from each of the two provinces —
East and West Pakistan. The board was to be responsible for policy, with
administration assigned to a director for each Academy, appointed by the board.
Each Academy was to have a full-time staff of ten social scientists, two of
whom would be specialists in research, and as many as six part-time subject-
matter specialists.
The two directors and the initial staff members were to be highly
qualified as to academic backgrounds and attitude. Worldwide recruitment and
relatively high salaries were suggested to attract this type of Pakistani
personnel. The training of the directors and staff members would be done
over a period of a year, roughly nine months in an American University,
preceeded by six weeks of orientation in Pakistan and followed by six weeks
of observation of rural development programs in selected Asian and European
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countries.
The survey team proposed operational and capital budgets for the first
four years (1957-1960) in the substantial amount of over 12 million taka.
This plan was presented to the government in August 1956. In June of
the following year, memoranda of agreement were reached between the
government, the Ford Foundation, and MSU for technical assistance to the
Academies, including funding of more than one million dollars from the
Foundation for both the Academies. On July 4, 1957, the government finally
approved the "Scheme for Pakistan Academies for Rural Development — Peshawar
and Comilla." The major differences between the approved plan and the MSU
proposal was that the two Academies were set up under separate boards rather
than a single national board under the prime minister. Between July and
December, MSU appointed a campus coordinator of the project and a MSU
resident representative in Pakistan; it also sent a second team of specialists,
again headed by Reeves ,to advise and consult with the government, officials
of the Ford Foundation, and of the United States International Cooperation
Administration, and to clarify numerous aspects of policy, organization, and
administration of the Academies. The Greek firm of Doxiadis Associates was
selected to design the Academy buildings. The architectural services were
to be financed by the Ford Foundation and the construction, except for
imported items, by the government. On December 19, 1957, two boards were
established for the "Pakistan Academies for Rural Development East/West
Pakistan" and their composition, powers, and related matters set forth
(Raper, 1970, pp. 23-26).
THE COMILLA MODEL
From its original inception, the Academy was an institution for the
training of government officials having present or potential responsibilities
for development programs, and for the conduct of research on rural
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development problems. It was claimed that something a good deal more than a
traditional academic approach to training and research was contemplated,
but the precise form which this new program would take was left to the
imagination and efforts of those who would execute the program. At Comilla,
the Academy from the very beginning conceived the idea of a pilot development
program, with training, research, and demonstration integrated into the life
of the rural community and the structure of the Pakistan bureaucratic
service.
The key method for giving effect to the Academy's philosophy of
development administration has been the use of a development laboratory.
Three months after the Academy opened, the director, Akhter Hameed Khan,
received permission from the V-AID administration to start demonstrating
what a development laboratory might be like in an area designated by
V-AID (80 square miles) as one of its "development areas." Four months
later the chief secretary of East Pakistan designated the whole of the
Comilla thana (107 square miles) as a development laboratory, and delegated
to the director considerable latitude to conduct programs and administrative
experiments in this already established unit of government (Raper, 1970,
p. 37).
Role of Akhter Hameed Khan
Almost everyone who has been exposed to the program would agree that
without Akhter Hameed Khan there would be no Comilla project in its present
form. Being the central personality involved with the project, he not only
contrived and elaborated the guidelines and policies of the Comilla project,
but also devoted all his time and energy to engineer those guidelines and
pol icies.
Khan obtained his Bachelors degree from Meerut College, India in history,
philosophy and English literature in 1932. He did his masters from Agra
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University on English Literature in 1934. Like some other bright students
of his generation, he competed successfully for Indian Civil Service Of 1936.
He attended Cambridge University, Magdalene College, as part of Indian Civil
Service training, special i zing in History and English literature.
His connection with Comilla district began in 1938, when he was appointed
as an Assistant magistrate there. In 1944, he resigned from the Indian Civil
Service. Khan's interest in cooperative activity can be traced back to that
time. After resigning from the Civil Service, he moved with his family to
Aligarh, United Provinces. There he worked as a locksmith aoorentice for
about two years to learn how the working men live. Durino this time
he organized a cooDerative workshop to manufacture locks and buckles.
Just prior to the partition he organized Khaksar, a political social
reformist movement and coedited the weekly Urdu and English newspaners
the organization. After that he started his career as an educationist and
came back to Comilla in 1950 as the principal of Comilla Victoria College.
His responsibility in the mainstream rural development activity began in
1954 when he served as the V-AID Administrator in East Pakistan. He was
appointed as the first Director of East Pakistan Academy for Village
Development in mid-1958. With a brief interruption, he performed this
responsibility till 1968. He received Honorary Doctor of Laws Degree from
Michigan State University in June 1964 (Raper, 1970, p. 293).
Hypotheses
Although no precise formula was available to the Academy at the
beginning of the program, several "working hypotheses"had been formulated
as to how the peasants could be helped to increase their production, and
thus secure a solid economic base for improvement of living standards.
The hypotheses were:
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1. A viable private economic organization was needed which could
serve as a basis for collaborative effort, and through which
mechanization and other improve methods could be introduced.
The central need, initially, was for the creation of capital
through savings.
2. The village would be recognized as the basic unit, with those
families whose heads decided to do so becoming members of a
local voluntary group.
3. Some linkage would be needed between these voluntary groups
in the village and the Academy. Since it would be impossible
to work directly with individual members of these groups, some
form of representation would be needed. The method suggested
was for each village group to select its representative, called
the "organizer," who would serve as fiscal agent and learner-
trainee. Soon thereafter one or two alert farmers and early
adopters would be selected as "modern farmers."
4. A training method would follow logically from the above in which
the organizers and model farmers would come to the Academy for
weekly training sessions, followed by village meetings where the
ideas learned would constitute the "lessons" for the villagers.
5. The early technical "inputs" would be furnished by the Colombo
Plan, which would use the Academy's own farm and some land in
nearby villages demonstration plots, and who would teach at
the weekly meetings and work with the model farmers.
6. In as much as only the simplest techniques such as line savings
and improved fertilization could be adopted at first by indivi-
dual villagers (considering the size of land holdings and other
available resources) early emphasis would be given to these
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techniques and extended soon thereafter to joint planning,
joint purchasing, credit and joint use of machinery (Raper,
1970 p. 46-47) .
Putting the six hypotheses together it seemed best to develop the
framework of cooperative principles which were known to the director,
faculty, and advisors. The broad principles of the cooperative movement--
savings,. educational meetings, joint planning, and action—were adopted
even though the past record of local cooperatives in the area was essentially
a record of dismal failure.
Cooperatives
In March 1960 the Academy appointed a special officer for cooperatives.
He had had more than a score of years of experience in organizing cooperatives
and was willing to make changes. His activities included visiting the
villages, joining the Friday Prayer in the Mosque and initiating discussions
about the peasants' everyday problems. Initially the discussions were one
way, since the villagers did not think they had much to say. But finally
the villagers began to take interest when he and the director would meet
with them constantly to talk about the need for organization, capital
formation, credit, simple improvements in their agricultural practices, and
especially about setting up low-lift pumps in the dry season, or opening
clogged drainage canals to lessen the damage from the monsoon flood. But
for the academy to help them, the Academy people explained, the villagers
would need to do certain things. It was necessary to form a viable
cooperative group, called a society. They should choose a chairman among
the more elderly and respected members of the group; his position would be
largely honorary, and would give moral support to the organizer, a younger,
active man who would be asked to take part in pioneering activities.
(Raper, 1970, pp. 47-49).
Soon after mid-1960 the Academy standardized the conditions a local
society would need to meet to be a part of the Academy's new cooperative
program. In addition to choosing a chairman, the group should:
1. organize itself and later become a registered cooperative society;
2. hold weekly meetings with compulsory attendance of all members;
3. select a trusted man from the group and send him"to the Academy
once a week for training (he should become the teacher and the
organizer of the group);
4. keep proper and complete records;
5. do joint production planning;
6. use supervised production credit;
7. adopt improved agricultural practices and skills;
8. make regular cash and in-kind savings deposits;
9. join the central cooperative federation;
10. hold regular member education discussions (Fairchild & Hussain,
1962, pp. 14-15).
The central objective of the cooperatives was expressed by Dr. Akhtar
Hameed Khan, as follows:
"Briefly the chief objective of this experiment would be
to promote the formation of small cooperative groups of
farmers who would adopt improved methods, implements,
and machines. A small group cooperative would aim to
become self -sustaining (Khan, 1961, p. 64).
Early in 1960 village-based cooperative societies were organized at
South Rampur and Monsasan, two villages in Comilla thana and ten days later
at Tongirpar, another village in the same administrative unit. Ten
cooperatives were organized by the end of May 1960--seven village-based
agricultural societies, a vegetable growers' society, a womens' cooperative,
and a weavers cooperative (Raper, 1970, pp. 49-50).
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Initially, the membership of the agricultural cooperatives were madeup
almost wholly of the smaller and middle-sized farmers. The larger farmers
leased out their lands and often were moneylenders and so had little or
no interest in becoming members of the local cooperative society (Raner,1970,
p. 50). It is mentionworthy that Dr. Khan and his associates were theoretically
commixed to the necessity of the maximum Darticipation of the small and
the middle peasants, instead of the big landowners in the cooperatives(Anwar,
1976, p. 13). Initially, by virtue of their personal efforts, they were able
to maintain the rural poor orientation of the project. As Blair(1978, d.?^)
described, in the early years administration of the credit programs in
Kotwali thana were rigorously supervised from the headquarters at Abhay
Ashram. Cooperative members had to contribute savings every week, submit
detailed production plans in order to get loans, and meet repayment schedules.
Inspector from higher levels regularly scrutinized the accounts maintained
by the village cooperatives. Malfeasance was difficult, if not impossible.
Yet at the same time, the operation was sufficiently small that the requirements
of different groups and the needs of individual cooperatives could be taken
into account. In other words, local men could be charged with administration as
managers and inspectors, yet could be kept honest through vigorous supervision
from above. All these factors naturally helped minimize buraucratic risk.
Blair further showed that as the program expanded, however, things
changed. This expansion came in three simultaneous directions. First the loan
issue in Kotwali thana Quintupled over a two year period from the 1965-66
crop year to the 1967-68 year. Second, oroduction was exDandino raoidlv
with the introduction of the new high-yielding varieties and the technology to
go along with them. Third, the program itself expended into new thanas,with
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7 thanas beyond the original one taken up in 1965-66 and some 13 more in
1963-69
.. Since all these developments took an immense amount of time and
energy, the care devoted to any one aspect of the operation necesserily
diminished; the criteria for loans became less stringent; farmers were allowed
to take out new loans without repaying old ones; administrative officers were
given quotas for loan issue to be disbursed; cooperative managers were to
promoted to inspectors inspite of poor repayment records. The "enterprising"
ones found that they were in a position to ct art new cooperatives
with bogus membership so that a few men could get the loan money
, and larqe
subsidies began to flow into the area in form of irrigation tubewells and fer-
tilizers for the new "miracle rice" technology. Officials found themselves
preoccupied with a system that grew from 440 cooperatives and 14,000 members
in 1965-66 to 1500 coops and 54,000 members just three years later- It was little
wonder that the control of the coops at village level passed into the hands
of local elites.
By the early seventees, most of the cooperative societies were dominated
by the better off farmers, who, by dint of their control over the rural
socio-politico-economic- cultural structures, directed the facilities offered
by the cooperatives to themselves.
The Comilla model experienced further expansion after Bangladesh came
into existence. In 1976, under the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP),
the Comilla model was extended to other districts and by 1977-78 there were
25,777 primary cooperatives in 250 thanas (Johnson, 1982, d.96).
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CHAPTER IV
COOPERATIVES IN ACTION: MEMB ERSHIP AND LEADERSHIP
As I already mentioned, one of the oft-heralded objectives of the Comilla
Model was to help the low income peasant families, by helping them to use the
improved technical facilities collectively. But the nature of the problem
of technological dissemination was much more complex than it was assumed by
the architects of the Comilla Model. There was a considerable amount of over-
simplification in the ideas of Dr. A.H. Khan and the other coplanners when they
thought that the benefits of the cooperative facilities can be reached by the
bottom layer of the society without disturbing the existing stratification
edifice. The report of the ministry of foreign affairs of the Netherlands
correctly assessed the problem, when it stated later that in most cases the
rural poor have not been reached by existing development services. The report
further states that given the present social structure in rural Bangledesh it is
somewhat naive to assume that scarce inputs will reach the small and marginal
agricultural families, if no strong safeguards are being built in this delivery.
The report, therefore, suggests an institutional framework for effectively
reaching the target group (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands, 1978. pp.
16-17).
Building up a new "institutional framework" requires supplantation of the
existing structural relationships, which constitute the foundation of the social
system in rural Bangladesh. Although Dr. Khan seemed to be aware of the exist-
ence of elaborate stratification within the peasant society, and some studies
were conducted by the Academy researchers on the class structure of the concerned
villages, (e.g., Majumdar, 1976) , I never found a systematic effort to address
the complexity of the rural class problem in the Academy's program. As I will show
later, instead of providing an alternative organizational structure to mobilize the
rural poor in the development projects, the Comilla cooperative societies were
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built on "natural social groupings" in the villages. The Comilla approach
focuses on social groupings in the project area, but aims at bringing into being
new social roles and new leadership groups consonant with a "modernization" in
agriculture as well as other soheres of rural Hfe.
There are obvious problems related to this approach. Efforts to reorient
the old order to the new tasks and roles required by rural development and
their first resistence in the structure of the old order itself. OpDOsition
to the cooperative experiment, grafted as it has been into the traditional
community structure, came precisely from those who perceived they might lose
in the new change(traditional leaders who gained most from the indigenous system
of rural credit). But once early opposition was overcome in many cooperative
societies and the advantages of cooperation tied to access to irrigation
facilities and new seed varieties become widely perceived, the benefits of
development were also coopted by the traditionally dominant elements in the
local vi 11 ages (Bertocci, 1976, p. 167). Empirical evidence on the membership
and leadership pattern of the cooperative societies and its consequences will
bear out my statement.
LANDHOLDINGS AND COOPERATIVE MEMBERSHIP
Landless laborers and near landless peasants are either under-represented
or not represented at all in the cooperative societies . Akhter( 1969) found
that, in Comilla thana, the landless and near landless( those with less than one
acre) made up over 45 percent of the total population, yet only 14 percent
of the cooperative membership (Table 1). Majumdar( 1976. o.l90)in his study of
the landholding pattern of cooperative members in a Comilla village found
that landless peasants are not at all represented in the cooperative societies.
The near landless category represents only 11.5 Dercent of the membershio(see
Table 2). The pattern of landholding of the members of 10 cooperatives
in Narshigdi thana , situated in thirty miles from the Dhaka city, was
50
OJ <—t <—
i
V i/)
•r- i.
•—
i
i—
t
C\J
51
«3- •-* •-*
52
studied by Rob (Rob, 1982, p. 56). Rob found that no landless peasants were
included as members of these 10 cooperatives and only 9 .87% of the below 1 acre
category are represented.
There are several reasons that may explain why the landless and near
landless families are unrepresented or underrepresented in the cooperatives.
First, the cooperative societies require that members make regular cash and
in-kind savings deposits, which many families with low incomes would find
difficult to do. Second, the loan policy of the cooperative generally excludes
persons with less than one acre from taking its loans, and thus, the small
landholders and low income families could not easily benefit from cooperative
membership.
However, if one only takes the membership pattern according to landholding
size in consideration, he might be tempted to conclude that the 1-2 acres
peasant category is the dominant group in the cooperatives. Akhtar found that
in Comilla thana, the largest single category of cooperative members (43
percent) were farmers with landholding from one to two acres. Of farmers with
this size of landholding, 68 percent belonged to cooperatives. In Majumdar's
study, 57.5 percent of the cooperative members own between one to two acres.
According to Rob, 57.36 percent of the cooperative members belong to the one
to two acre category. However, a further look at the problem will show that
although this category constitutes the quantitative majority, it does not
possess the dominant position in the cooperative societies.
COOPERATIVE LEADERSHIP
The oft-mentioned thesis that a group of new non-traditional leaders are
leading the cooperative societies mostly advocated by the Academy sponsored
researchers, (e.g., Alam,1976) is based upon two assumptions: a) lineage is
the predominant phenomenon in rural stratification in Bangladesh; and b)
lineage is a rigid, inflexible conceptual category.
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It is often suggested that since a significant section of the cooperative
leadership comes from non-traditional* lineage background, cooperative
societies are characterized by a new, "modern" leadership pattern. However,
the aforementioned fundamental assumptions of this line of thinking donot
reflect the actual situation in rural Bangladesh.
First, class position, not lineage status is more important in the peasant
society of rural Bangladesh. Maloney (1974, p. 356) observes that the real
basis of status differentiation in Bengali villages is landowning. According
to Zaidi's (1970) survey in a Comilla Village, Muslims agreed that ranking of
families is on the basis of land and wealth.
Second, it is likely that there will be a continually changing balance
of strength between lineages. In this respect Bertocci (1970) has distin-
guished in his thesis between sardari lineages (having traditional high status)
and non-sardari lineages which have acquired some economic strength and have
thereby become politically important and in some cases dominant through money-
lending and other forms of patronage. From this he infers a great deal of
fluidity to the system in which different lineages rise to power as rich
peasants, and where they are not from sardari lineages then acquiring status by
marrying into sardari lineages. He refers to this process as a 'cyclical
kulakism'. So, even where the cooperative leadership didpot come from the
traditional families, they belong to the "rich peasant" category and claim a
traditional lineage title by dint of their control over wealth. This is
largely possible because of the flexible lineage pattern in rural East Bengal.
Blair (1979) notes that there is little conflict between the traditional and
cooperative leadership in terms of their interest in maintaining domination
"Lineages which have been holding prestigious titles for a relatively shorter
period of time.
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over the rural areas. In the study of 10 cooperatives in Tangail district it
has been conclusively found that although in the case of only one cooperative
had the traditional village leader been the manager, there had hardly been any
conflict between the traditional leaders of the village and the leaders of the
cooperatives (Chowdhury & Haque,1978).
Another study of 25 village cooperatives in Comilla found that leadership
positions in these cooperatives have gone to the kinsmen and relatives of the
traditional leaders and, therefore, there was no visible conflict between
traditional and cooperative leaders (Amhed,1972) . In another case study
Rahim (1965-66) found that the most influential person in the village was also
the manager of the cooperatives and the cooperative leadership
was infract a
weapon in village politics to further the interest and position of the ricn
peasants.
Reza (1982) found in his village studies that although all the decisions
regarding cooperative farming are ideally supposed to be taken in an open
meeting of the members, in actual practice the situation is altogether
different. More often than not, it has been found that important decisions are
taken by the president and the secretary himself, the general members remaining
as mute spectators of the whole scene. The decision taken in the name of the
members are communicated to them at a later date. The cooperative leaders
stay in power year after year, despite the minimum requirement for the once-a-
year election (Chowdhury, 1983, p. 175).
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RICH PEASANT'S DOMINATION
Johnson (1982, p. 92) observes that the cooperatives, as they work today,
are institutions for competition for scarce resources and for enrichment of
the few and powerful instead of for the protection of the poor. The survey of
the cooperatives in Tangail district (Chowdhury & Hague, 1978) shows
that the
money received by these cooperative societies is distributed
among 32.5
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percent of the cooperative members. The major share of this money went to the
chairman, manager, and model farmers who belonged to the "large" landowning
category. Islam (1978) observes that the rich farmers proved powerful
competitors in pre-empting resources of the cooperatives for their own use.
They tend to borrow the largest amounts; they are also the most frequent
defaulters and contributed the smallest percentage of savings mobilized by the
cooperatives. It is mentionworthy that the middle peasants are the major
contributors to the cooperative funds. Obaidullah (1971-2) found that between
1965-6 and 1973-4 the percentage of members who obtained access to credit
declined from a high as 85% in 1965-6 to 12% in 1973-4. There was a decline
not only in the percentage of the members of the cooperatives who secured
loans but also in the absolute number of borrowers. At the same time there
was an increase in the average size of loans over the years. Another study
in the Comilla district found that 54% of the overdue loans were for less than
Taka 500 comprising 15% of the total overdue loans, whereas 6% of the overdue
lonas were for Taka 2500 and more, amounting in total to 78% of the aggregate
overdue loans. Moreover, the amount of the per capita overdue loans for the
members of the managing committee was more than sixteen times greater than
that for the ordinary members (Blaie, 1978).
That the "rich farmers" enjoyed a large share of the benefits of modern
inputs which were also subsidized was also evidence from whatever data were
available on the distribution of inputs by farm size. Wood's (1976) poor
peasant respondents in a Comilla village referred to their inability to
obtain adequate supplies of fertilizer, alleging at the same time the
available supplies had been monopolized by the rich and powerful families in
the village. Muqtada's (1975) study shows that the per acre use of fertilizer
in the cultivation of the local variety of Boro (winter rice) was 29 pounds
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for holdings below 2.5 acres; 38 pounds for holdings between 4 and 6 acres, and
45.5 pounds for holdings above 10 acres. In the case of the high-yielding
varieties of rice, the average amount of fertilizer used per acre by all the
sizes of holdings was generally higher, but again it was higher for the bigger
farms, i.e., 56 pounds for farm sizes below 2.5 acres, as against 72 pounds
for 4-6 acres.
Similarly, domination of the rich peasants is also evident in water
resource distribution. It is the large and rich farmers under the irrigation
scheme who benefit most, especially the few rich farmers who can collect the
payment for irrigation water (Jansen, 1979, p. 78). The average area irrigated
is positively correlated with the size of holdings (Alam,1975,p. 17). The
controller of the water pump, who is a rich farmer, in most cases, only gives
water to farmers who pay well and to farmers who are "clients " (Jansen, 1979,
p. 76). A number of researchers (e.g., Harrison, 1981) have suggested that hand-
pump, instead of deep tubewell should be used in the "poverty stricken"
agricultural economy of Bangladesh, because of its low cost, handiness, and
labor intensiveness. But again, the social and distributional effect of the
handpump depends very much on who gets access to the handpump. Jansen (1979)
suggests that while deep tubwells often function as a means for strengthening
the patron-client relationship type of social organization in the rural areas,
the handpumps can function as a means to break up this pattern. But he notes
that where the handpump has been introduced, rich farmers have threatened poor
farmers and refused them any loans if they start to use handpumps for irrigation.
Blair (1974, pp. 60-61) following the research report of the Comilla
Academy, points out that a very powerful manager of the cooperative society
can steal money and juggle the accounts. Not being responsible to any
organized hierarchy, he can afford to show incompetence in organizing joint
projects. By directing credit, fertilizer, water resources, and fund money
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TABLE 3 Percent Increase in Yield Per Acre, by Size of Holding, Comil la, 1972
c . , _ Percentage Increase inSize of Farm v„ij n nYield Per Acre
Below 1 acres 78%
1 to 3.5 acres 125%
Over 3.5 acres 124%
Average 98% .
Difference between smallest
and largest farmers -46%
Source: Rahim, S. A. , 1972, p. 36.
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to themselves, the large farmers secure a larger percentage increase in yield
per acre from high-yielding varieties than the smaller farmers as shown in
Table 3. Operation of "Public Works Program"
,
an important project of the
Comilla Model has also been dominated by the locally rich acting as brokers and
contractors with government and agencies seizing the opportunities for an
extension of patronage and a new form of economic diversification (Wood, 1980,
p. ID.
Thus, the cooperative societies reflect the differentiation pattern of the
peasant society in rural Bangladesh. The myth of 'grass roots development'
proven a failure to develop the lives of those who live. lives of continual
poverty, starvation, and helplessness.
CHAPTER V
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VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL MOBILIZATION
From tae perspective of the present work, the rural cooperatives
are
related to social, economic, political and cultural processes far
more profound
than the developments in the formal cooperative structures. Owing
to this
dependence, the cooperatives constantly interact with the broader
social setting.
Thus, the processes predominant in the objective conditions which govern
society ail whole have to be explicated to answer the central questions of
the
present thesis-(i) how the rich peasants captured and maintain the
leadership
of the cooperatives and (ii) what is the potential for an
organized protest
from the rural poor against the rich peasant's domination
over the rural
cooperatives in particular, and the institutionalized structural
relationships
in general. These two questions are definitely
interrelated and overlapping,
and to isolate one from the other for analytical purpose
is artificial. The
continual dominance of the rich peasant and the erosion
of the positions of
the poor peasants both may provide the latter a
grievance, but they also make
horizontal ™bilization in assertion of that
grievance.virtually impossible.
The present chapter intends to examine six general
processes which constitute
the existing structural relationships in rural Bangladesh. The processes
are
networks, territorial organization, factionalism and
clientelism, ideological
domination, the role of the state, and the nature of the
political oarties.
KINSHIP NETWORKS
The study of kinship networks is very important
for it forms the core
of rural power structure in rural Bangladesh. Here
in this sub-chapter I shall
primarily deal with the role of ki n-,nfrastructure in the
area under question.
In doing so, I shall discuss here the various institutions
such as khana(house-
hold), paribar(family), bari (homestead) , gushthi (1 ineage) ,
and atmiya-svdjan
(kinsmen). The main basis of these institutions' formation
is various .sorts of kin-
ties
.
Khana (Household)
Khana or household is the smallest unit of social organization which is
the basic unit of kinship group in rural Bangladesh. It is the primary unit of
production and consumption. The members of a household take food from the
same hearth, so, it is also called "chula", which means hearth group, especially
in the Dhaka-Comilla belt. A family or paribar may consist of one or more
households.
Paribar (Family)
Paribar (Family) is the social group characterized by common residence,
economic cooperation and reproduction. The families in rural Bangladesh may be
divided in three categories, namely (a) joint, (b) extended, and (c) nuclear.
In joint families, the kin of three or more generations live under one
roof and share all land and property owned. Such a family normally
consists of brothers, their parents, sisters, wives and children. All the
males here are co-owners of the land and property. They cook at a common
hearth, store grain inacommon granary and so on. The head of the joint
family is the eldest male member or some other responsible male member of the
family.
The extended family is a group of nuclear families and related individuals
from several generations who reside together in the same household, but their
ciiuias (hearth) are separate. In this type of family, the constituting house-
hold units do not own land and property commonly. Major decisions in an
extended family are, however, taken through consultation among the senior
members of the household units.
A nuclear family consists of a husband and a wife with or without
children. It may also be a family of a widowed mother living together with her
unmarried sons and the like. In some cases, one or more individuals may reside
with them. They usually live in one house and always have a common hearth.
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Rob found that 63 percent of total families are nuclear, 22.1 percent
are joint and the rest are extended in Dhaka district (Rob, 1982, p. 39).
Bertocci shows that 51.9 percent of the total families in Comilla villages
(studied by him) are nuclear (Bertocci, 1972, p. 33) and Elickson found 58
percent of the families are nuclear (Elickson, 1972, p. 33).
Bari (Homsetead )
The next wider group is bari (homestead). A bari normally consists of
several households, which usually share the same courtyard of the
bari. There are kin relationships among almost all the members of the khanas
in a bari. In a recent study in the Matlab Thana of Comilla district,
Aziz shows that in 75.40 percent baris (in his sample village) heads of
households were patrilineally related; in 18.03 percent, at least one head of
the household was officially related to the rest; and in 6.55 percent, at
least one head of household was unrelated to the rest (Aziz, 1979, p. 24). Aziz
found cooperation among the bari members and described the bari as a cohesive
social unit. According to Wood(1976), most baris had an acknowledged head in
Kotwali khana in Comilla district. Wood, of course, admits that small baris
are often indistinguishable from larger neighbors and so their heads are not
generally recognized as bari leaders in the village. It is worth mentioning
that the most wealthy and prestigious families enjoy the dominant position in
a given bari (Rob, 1982, p. 75).
Sushthi (lineage )
A group of baris may again comprise a gushthi (lineage). In such a case,
all these gusthis are agnatically related with the exception of in-marrying
wives and out-marrying daughters. A gushti , therefore, consists of all the
male patrilineal descendents of a male ancestor. Common ancestory provides a
sense of belonging that binds together the members of a gushti.
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Gushthi is considered as a significant source of local prestige and high
standing in rural society. This prestige is often reflected in the
titles attached to a given gushthi. Thus, a gushthi often entitled "Chowdhury"
indicate its past or present association with wealth in land, since historically
the Chowdhuiries were officials in the Mughal revenue system and often gained
land, as well as their title, by participation in it. Such are also the cases
with the Majumdars (another land-revenue gushthi) and Khandakar (a gushthi of
priests who were important in the spread of Islam in Bengal). Bertocci (1974,
p. 106), in his sample villages, found that there were some dozen. titles which
denoted prestige of wealth, religion, or occupation. Nearly 75% of the
instances in which they occur were in association with the gushthis and ban's
of peasants at the middle or well-to-do standard of land ownership we have
indicated. Only 25% of their occurrence was associated with the gushthis and
baris of poor or landless peasants. The distribution of prestigious titles
tends, then, to correlate with the distribution of wealth.
But, for the sake of avoiding analytical errors, one has to keep in mind
that these gushthi differences are by no means hardened into caste-like lines.
Rather, it is the class, which dictates the term in rural Bangladesh. Writers
on the Muslims of South Asia often quote the old Muslim proverb "Last year I
was a Jolaha (a weaver of low status), this year I am a Shaikh, and if the
crops are good next year I shall be a Sayyid" (Ibid). So gushthi mobility in
the Bengali villages is basically a function of wealth. Bertocci found that
if one discussed this subject with his sample villagers they would say that
"if one's economic situation is good, his lineage's status is also good."
Bertocci mentioned that there was truth in the claim, for it was possible for
a poor but respected family to marry into one of more fortunate economic
circumstances. It also often happens that a family of middle-level economic
position may become well-to-do and begin to call itself by a title such as
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Majumdar or Chowdhury.
Gushthi plays an important political role by providing structural support
for rich peasants' political dominance and attaching social prestige to the
political leadership. It is noteworthy tna t the dominant (not necessarily
traditional) gushthis possess the dominant positions in the traditional social
organizational as well as the "modern" state sponsored institutions.
Atmiya-svajan (Kinsmen )
In rural Bangladesh, if an individual or a group of individuals is related
to another individual or individuals either by blood or by marriage,
these individuals are known as atmiya-svajan or kinsmen. A common ancestor is
not necessary to become an atmiya. Atmiya-svajan is a very wide term which may
include several gushthis and may extend over a wide geographical area.
The rich peasant's broad extension of kinship networks helps him to
strengthen his political power. Marriage is so far the most effective way for
extending kinship network in rural Bangladesh. It is evident from a number of
studies (Reza, 1983, Rob, 1982, Hassan, 1982) that the higher lineages who were
also richer peasants are able to sustain kinship links at a greater distance
than the poorer families of their village, although, of course, local strategic
marriages would also be made for alliance purposes. The importance of such
extended kinship links for class consciousness and solidarity is self-evident.
Table 4 demonstrates the marriage pattern in relation to landholding category
in 5 villages in Dhaka district.
TERRITORIAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
The rich peasant's control over the rural society is also possible through
his control over the territorial social organizations. It is one of the most
effective ways through which the rich peasant exercises his clout and authority
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over the social, political, economic and cultural structure. The most
important levels of these traditional organizations, each with a territorial
dimension are reyai (homestead cluster) and samaj(society or association).
Reyai (Homestead Cluster)
The homestead in rural Bangladesh are often bunched in clusters, each of
which is distinct from the others. It seems reasonable to suppose that over
time, as settlement of a given area proceeded, the nearness of homesteads in
clusters facilitated contact and interaction among their respective members to
a greater extent than with others, at least on a day to day basis. Over time,
many collective activities, both formal and informal, appear to have emerged
which gave a sense of social solidarity to the inhabitants of one homestead
cluster as opposed to others.
Within each homestead cluster, the families which are usually greater in
wealth and population are looked to by the others for leadership in collective
affairs and matters of common concern. In these families, certain men in
particular assert leadership, especially in the settling of disputes. These
leaders are called Sardar (leader) or Matabbar (chief, head, first man). Thus,
growing out of the pattern of settlement, the homestead cluster emerges as a
social grouping, in which the members of the group acknowledge the formal
leadership of one or more sardari families. The group has a special name,
reyai, derived probably from Arabic, raiyyah, meaning "follower" or "citizen"
(Bertocci, 1974, p. 91).
Samaj (Society or Association )
Samaj is a group of people living together which has a territorial
boundary and which has a common-socio-political identity. Etymologically ,
samaj is rooted in the notion of "going together", although in its modern
usage, it is rightly translated as "society" in general, or in more limited
context "association". Bertocci (1979) found samaj's in two villages of
Camilla district to be composed of a number of a territorially continuous reyai-s.
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While the samaj continues to regulate intracaste marriages and delimit
marriage circles for rural Bangali Hindus today, nearly everywhere for
Bengali Muslims, the samaj form is both a symbolic and an organizational
referent for the political and religious community.
Normally, a samaj grouping doesn't extend over a larger territory than a
village. On the other hand, a village may contain several samaj groupings,
with distinct statuses and life styles, in its territory. A
samaj may consist
of one or more gushthis.
,
Each samaj has its informal council of elders who influence its members.
The council of members is usually composed of the leaders of the wealthiest
baris and reyais, under whom a samaj is united in loyalty and under whose
sponsership, various religious and political activities take place.
The samaj pattern is taken as a significant frame of reference for social
activities. Within the samaj, the members try to settle their own internal
conflicts and disputes. Social control of individuals who are involved in
activities against the social and religious tradition of the society is an
important function of the samaj. Moreover, a samaj performs a variety of
functions such as the approval of marriage negotiations, conducting the
marriage ceremony including the invitations and cooking arrangement, serving
food to the guests, etc. and organizing some other social and religious
festivals.
However, the understanding of these kin and extra-kin organizations
would be far from complete without a discussion of the process of factionalism.
FACTIONALISM AND CLIENTALISM
Factional ism
Ralph Nicholas' work in West Bengal has been pioneering in the analysis
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of rural power structure in terms of factions. In his paper on the role of
social science research in Bangladesh, he concludes:
"Villages, which appear to be the most "natural" of human
communities and the most obvious basis for cooperative
development organization, frequently prove to be cockpits
of bitter struggle, factionalism and the very opposite of
cooperation; no one has an effective remedy, but it is clear
that rural development is severely hampered by the prevalance
of such conflict. Social scientific research cannot solve any
of these problems, but by identifying them and dispelling some
of the qeneral iqnorance that prevails about them, it may
provide policy makers with an initial basis for action"
(Nicholas, 1963, p. 26).
The term 'faction' is used to describe a pervasive form of peasant
political interaction, especially in South Asia (For details, see Nicholas,
Ranton, 1965, Swartz, 1966). The central point about this mode of
politics
is that factional alignments cut across class alignments. They
thus form
a vertical mobilization pattern, "organized and integrated by
rank, mutual
dependence, and the legitimacy of traditional authority" (Rudolph 8
Rudolph,
1967, p. 24). In almost all the cases, faction leadership
is provided by Sardars
and Matabbars, the community leaders already reffered to(Schandel
,1974,0.65)
.
Factional conflicts can emerge for a variety of reasons. There can
be conflicts over land, wealth, and other forms of property. It has been
observed that factions are also formed on the basis of unequal distribution
of agricultural credits and inputs, relief goods etc. Factional conflicts
also begin over the nomination, selection, or election of a person or
persons in the local bodies like Union Parishad and local institutions like
cooperatives. Conflict for the nomination for the most temporary organiza-
tion, like a relief committee or a village committee, also sometimes
strengthen factional feelings.
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An important aspect of factional conflict is that rival factions are, in
general, structurally similar, namely that they represent similar configurations
of social groups, although that is by no means always the case. Where that is
so, the factional model describes a segmental rather than class conflict.
Such conflicts, therefore, do not have an ideological expression, because
rival factions or faction leaders fight for control over resources, power and
status within the existing framework' of society.
Patron-Client Relationship
Patronage is a very important element which forms the
foundation of
factions in rural Bangladesh. The relationship
between the leader and the
followers of a faction can be termed as patron-client
relationship. This
relationship is based on reciprocity, a mechanism often
alleged, to be for
mutual benefit. An apt description of
this is:
"A relationship involving an interchange of
non-comparable goods
and services between actors of unequal
socio-economic rank
(Powell, 1970, p. 412).
Patrons, the faction leaders manipulate things
in favor of the clients, the
supporters. The clients lend their support to the
patrons in return. Whether
it is in the distribution of agricultural credit or
input, or in any other
material resource, a patron distributes .favors to
the people who are likely
to surrender their allegiance to him. In this
system, the under-privileged
learn that the only way to enjoy protection and other
resources monopolized
by the powerful is to return loyalty in place
of benefits received. On the
other hand, for the powerful, giving means a
rise in the hierarchy of social
authority. Where the market has not yet fully
developed, and the exercise of
state power is intermittent or in certain occas 10 n the
state action is marked
by impotence, generosity is a ratnonal form of
investment.
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Bailey (1969, p. 49) distinguishes between "core" and "following" of a
faction. The 'core' represents in inner circle of allies with multiple
relationships to the leader, usually involving close kinship links. On the
other hand, the "following" represents the non-kin member of a faction. Only
the core represents a permanent, corporate group, while the rest of the
faction is essentially impermanent.
Fationalism facilitates horizontal mobilization at the top; at the
bottom, factionalism severally inhibits it.
Mobilization Pattern
Bertocci U970, p. 101) observes factionalism results in solidifying of
some groups, and the splitting up and rearranging of the others. Seldom, if
ever, are the landless and poor peasantry able to exploit factional rivalries
among the surplus farmers to their advantage. The rich peasants have a vested
interest in maintaining the present structure of domination. Although they
are divided in factions by virtue of their control over the structures of rural
politics, wealth and status they can effectively maintain that control. Thus
their dominant class position counterbalances their internal strife. The
rural poor lack such counterbalancing factors. Moreover, since the rural
poor has an interest in transforming the present stratification arrangement,
they need much more organizational strength than the dominants.
It is interesting to note that if there is any possibility of class
mobilization among the lower strata, the faction leaders act collectively,
although for the time being, to prevent that. In 1981. when i was working
as a paid social worker in the Char (.islet) areas of Noakhali district, I
discerned this trend in the local villages. After the seasonal flood, a
large amount of alluvial lands emerged from the river. These highly fertile
lands were a significant source of rural conflict. Like many rural hinterlands,
this area's incorporation in the state administrative and judicial structures was
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far from complete and there is no consistent rule to determine the
ownership of these lands. The local influential factions compete for them.
Eventually, the ownership of the lands is legitimized by the muscles of the
respective factions. In 1981, the local peasant association, backed by a
leftist political party, attempted to mobilize the poor peasants and
landless laborers to claim ownership of these lands. The community leaders,
despite their factional conflicts, stood up against this attempt as a
collective entity. When the peasant association submitted a memorandum to
the district administration urging it to take nacessery measures to distribute
these lands among the poor peasants and landless laborers, the local
factional leaders exercised their clout to have the bureaucracy turn a deaf
ear to the rural poor's demand.
So we can safely state that the prevalence of factional politics
in the villages, characterized by vertical cleavages dominated by rich
peasants, hinders the emergence of class solidarity among the poor and
landless peasants, and helps maintain the status guo.
STRUCTURE OF IDEOLOGICAL DOMINATION
Values: Fate and Effort
A combination of scriptural Islam, a set of Bengali values focused
on the themes of fate and effort, and property concepts both colonial and
precolonial constitute ideological supports for the present system of
domination. Though sharing a common culture, dominant and dominated
emphasize different aspects of this combination.
The central theme of the prevailing ideology among the dominated
strata in rural Bangladesh is Taqdir, "Fate". In this specific cultural
context, the term is a syncretized form of the scriptural dichotomy between
man and God, and thus the question of predestination by divine will, ana a
set of little cultural values", e.g., pessimism, fatalism, allegiance to
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the existing system. Theoretically, Taqdir refers to the predestined limits
and potentialities bestowed by "Allah" on each individual life (Bertocci,
1979, p. 52).
However, our generalization need some clarification. A number of
detailed empirical studies have shown that peasants, far from being in some
primeval state of traditionalism have good reasons for being fatalist or
pessimist (Hutton & Cohen, 1975). It may be a realistic assessment of
their circumstances in the face of severe natural and social constraints.
Under these constraints, the dominated peasant acquiesces to his poverty
and also to any political or social authority imposed on him.
This acquiescence is reinforced by the localized form of Islam.
Religion in Bengal, whether Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, has been
influenced by Tantrism (Bertocci, 1966, p. 7), which has a heavy emphasis
on other worldliness (Sengupta, 1978, p. 18). The Sufi missionaries, whose
doctrines were akin to the mysticism and tantrism already prevalent in this
area were largely responsible for the other worldly and relatively passive
nature of local Islam (Roy, 1971, p. 23).
But it would be erroneous to assume that Islam is interpreted by
different classes in the same way. It is interesting to note how different
classes justify their positions by using the apparently contradictory
* Robert Redfield (1956), in his book "Peasant Society and Culture", speaks
of the culture of the peasant community as an aspect or dimension of the
larger culture of the group of which the community is a part. He speaks of
a "little culture", represented by the particular peasant community, and a
"greater culture", characterized by something of what goes on in the minds
of remote teachers, priests, or philosophers whose thinking affects and
affected by the peasantry.
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concepts of scriptural Islam. While Taqdir justifies the rural poor's
helplessness, Tadbir, "Effort" functions as the predominant ideological
theme for the rich peasantry.
"Tadbir" refers to the obligation of each individual to realize
via maximum effort the fullness of one's given potentiality (Bertocci,
1979, p. 52). Thus individuals' relative social ranks and prestige are
seen as outcomes measured by and following from their own efforts. In a
resource-scarce society, "Tadbir" operates strongly on the rich peasants
(and the ambitious section of the middle peasantry) who compete with each
other for resources, power and status in local socio-economic-political
arenas. It is weakest in the case of the poor peasants and landless
laborers. Field studies indicate that they are either reluctant to play
the game or aware of the impossibility in the absence of the necessary
resources and linkage (Jahangir, 1980).
It would be erroneous to perceive the relationship between the
ideology of the dominant class and that of the dominated strata as an
"antagonistic contridictory" one. Rather these two ideological points of
view are complementary and may be variously evoked according to
circumstances or changes in them. This may be the way to interpret the
findings of Inkeles and Smith (1974, Ch. 13). As part of a cross-cultural
social-psychological study of "becoming modern", they found that
participation in the Comilla Cooperatives had a significant effect on
attitudes by comparison with peasants who did not participate.
Comparing cooperative members with men from other parts of their district
of Comilla, Inkeles and Smith found that of the co-op members some 65
percent were classified as "modern men""* whereas a mere 20 percent of the
other Comilla villagers won that designation. Even within the same
village, they found, those who were cooperative members proved to be more
73
"modern"than those who were not. Of the non-members in the cooperating
villages, only 25 percent earned the designation of "modern" men, whereas
65 percent of the actual co-op members were so classified. However, it is
possible that these men were not demonstrating some master trend toward
"modernity" but a response to new opportunities. Possibly they were
evoking more themes of Effort and less of Fate already there in their own
culture because their circumstances had changed.
Perpetuation Through Religious Leadership
One of the effective media through which the existing structure
of ideological domination is perpetuated is the informal institution of
religious leadership. The leaders are known as Mullahs, Maulanas. and
Pirs. The Mullah is the prayer leader (Imam) and religious functionary
who performs various ceremonies, although his influence often carries over
from the religious to the secular sphere. Maulanas are more educated in
theology than the Mullahs, and serve as interpreters on religious matters.
The Mullah may be able to support himself entirely through his religious
occupation; he may receive a salary in cash or kind as prayer leader in
the Mosque, and gifts or cash for performing ceremonies for village
residents. But Maulanas generally earn most of their support from secular
occupations (Bertocci, 1966, p. 10). These individuals are usually
included in the informal leadership of the village.
* Inkeles and Smith operated with the assumption that individual modernity
could be considered as a syndrom of qualities. This approach to defining
the modern man was, therefore, the development of a lona list of themes,
e.g., active public participation, calculabi 1 ity or work commitment, each
of which they felt reasonably be reflected in the attitudes, values, and
behavior of the modern man.
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Pirs or Muslim saints play an important part in the religious
life of Bangladesh. Unlike the other religious leaders, Pirs need not have
any religious education. They collect a following on the basis of personal
piety and charisma; quite often this following consists of Hindus as well
as Muslims. Pirs are believed to possess great "barkat" (holiness), which
can be passed from the Pir to another individual.. Thus if an ill person
were to swallow water in which a pir had bathed, barkat would enter his
body and enable him successfully combat his disease (Karim, 1955, p. 33).
Although scriptural Islam does not allow for an institutionalized
priesthood, these religious leaders function as the moral and spiritual
authority of the population. These religious leaders maintain close
relations with the dominant families. The rich peasant is either the donor
or founder of the village Mosque and "Madrasha" (traditional religious
school), or hold the top posts on such committees (Jahangir, 1982, p. 129).
The Mullahs are associated with one or another dominant "bari" who provide
food, shelter and salary to the Mullahs. In return, the Mullahs provide
moral justification to the rich peasant's domination. I personally
experienced in a number of villages in Muradnagar and Laksham Thana that
the Mullahs and Maulanas praise the rich peasant families in the Friday
Weekly prayer meetings. In case of factional conflict, Mullahs and
Maulanas associated with each faction justifies the point of view of their
patrons.
It is very common in the villages that the religious leaders
justify the social stratification pattern by stating that "Hater Punch
Angul Shaman Hoy Na" (five fingers cannot be equal); here the five fingers
are used as a metaphor for unequal classes. The religious leaders
provide moral support to the rich peasant's material efforts by saying "ue
nijara Shahajjaya Kore Na, Allah tare shajjaya kore na" (God does not help
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anybody, if he does not help himself). They reinforce the belief of poor
people in their own incompetence by preaching that "Ai jonme koshto kore
porer jamme shukh haibi" (If you suffer in this life, you will attain
happiness in the next life), or "Baralog-garib hawa kopaler likhan" (it is
a matter of fate to be rich or poor). The Mullahs also deliver "waz"
(religious discourses) supporting the policies of the existing government
and/or dominant political party (Reza, 83, p. 194).
The religious leaders not only justify the existing system, they
also attack the counter ideas which may cause threat to the system. In
many Friday prayers and Annual Eid prayers the Mullahs or Maulanas
vehemently attack revolutionary ideas as "nashtique and naforman" (athiest
and sinful).
A Pir may be much more influential than a Maulana or a Mullah.
His influence may extend beyond the local sphere. The Pir of Sharashina,
who had his base in a northern-western district, was a distinguished
personality in provincial politics during the Pakistani period.
The influence of the famous "Pir of Atroshi", who has his
religious center in Faridpur district in Dhaka division, however, outpaced
all previous examples. Many highranking government officials, leading
businessmen and other influential figures are his disciples. The present
President and Chief Martial Law administrator of Bangladesh is among his
close disciples. In 1981, when there was a serious difference of opinion
and conflict between the then civilian President Abdus Sattar, who is also
the Pir's disciple, and the present President and the then Chief of Army
Staff General Hossain Muhammad Ershad, it was the Pir of Atroshi who
temporarily patched it up.
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The local pirs, in the same fashion, have an important part in
local factional politics. In many cases, factions have their own pirs who,
with the help of "spirits and ghosts", including the "jin" (to which the
English word 'genie' is related) of the Koran, are believed to damage
the property, family, even ife of the rival faction. Syed Waliullah, a
prominent Bengali Literater, illustrates in his classic novel "Bahipir"
how the local Pirs take advantage of the ignorance and naivity of the rural
poor.
Communication Flows
Besides the institutionalized ideological structure of the
Mullahs, Maulanas and Pirs, another important way to maintain the existing
ideological structure is the rural elite's control over uninstitutionalized
communication flow in the village. This type of control is basically
maintained by the personal influence of a local notable on the people who
look up to him for the explanation of almost everything.
Inspired by social science investigations in the west, the Rural
Development Academy in Comilla sponsored a series of studies in the 1960s.
These dealt with the diffusion and adoption process and the patterns of
communication in the village. As a part of this program, Rahim (1965)
attempted to analyze systematically the patterns of interpersonal
influence, diffusion and adoption of agriccultural practices. In Goalgaon,
the village in Comilla district where Rahim conducted his study, peoole
sought information and advice from influential on production techniques,
personal conflict, family feuds, criminal offences, even on major political
issues.
From the data available Rahim draws the conclusion that the flow
of influence in this village is from (i) younger to older persons, (ii)
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educated to illiterate, (iii) newspaper reader to non-reader, (iv) mobile
person to less mobile person, (v) higher social status to lower social
status holder and finally, (vi) within the same economic class of
peasants. Among these, four flow-types are vertical flows of information
in terms of economic class and social status, (ii,, iii, iv, and v). In a
society, where illiteracy rate is as high as eighty-five percent, access to
education and newspaper indicates a stronger class position. Again, the
rich peasants are in an advantageous position in terms of mobility.
Table 4 and Bar Diagram I, show the horizontal and vertical flow
of influence by the six characteristics. The vertical flow of influence in
Goalgaon is clearly the predominant type. Except in the case of age, the
flow is from persons belonging to a higher level to persons belonging to a
lower level.
Further detailed analysis indicated that the horizontal flow of
influence showed considerable variation in different levels. A large
majority of horizontal flow takes place between individuals belonging to
higher levels. On lower levels horizontal flow of influence is less
frequent. The distribution of total horizontal-f low-diads over high,
medium and low levels are 74 percent, IS percent and 8 percent
respectively.
The predominantly vertical flow of influence helps the rich
peasants to perpetuate the existing structure of ideological domination and
reinforces the vertical mobilization. The high frequency of horizontal
communication in the upper levels facilitates horizontal mobilization at
the top.
78
BAR DIAGRAM 1
VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL FLOWS OF INFLUENCE
GOALGAON, COMILLA, 1965.
FLOW OF INFLUENCE:
vertical mm
HORIZONTAL P^
MASS MEDIA ECONOMIC EMPATHY
CONTACT STATUS
Source: Rahim, 1965, p. 31.
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ROLE OF THE STATE
There is a connection between the issues of rural inequality and
the nature of the state apparatus because of the way the state favors the
classes on whose support it depends for survival. Thus our analysis of
rural structural relationships must be considered in the wider context of
the interconnections between classes in the countryside and the social base
of the state in Bangladesh.
Mature of the State: A Theoretical Issue
There is an important theoretical issue which must be confronted
at this point. Much of the conventional analysis of the rural politicaal
process treats the rural community as a set of isolated social structures,
traditionally independent of other rural communities and of other national
level institutions. This has encouraged a conceptualization of the
development and nation-building process which assumes a dichotomy between
the traditional and modern sectors in the society. It therefore views the
proccess as one of incorporating the traditional structures and
institutions into modern ones, thereby destroying the discrete social
entities that characterize the rural social formation.
Underlying this approach is an elite-mass formation, with the
elite (or part of it) as a modernizing force. The building of a new nation
demands the integration of the society to the point where national
institutions (the political party, the bureaucracy, the judicial process,
the planning commission, etc.) become the primary focus of loyalty
instead of the family, the reyai, the samaj, village religious or
linguistic community, and which become therefore legitimate. It is a
stimulus-response model of political and social change, where the
'modernizing' elite both sets the goals and evaluates the extent of their
achievement. But the goals and the evaluation derive from the assumotion
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that rural political and social structures are discrete and encapsulation
of the village is the most significant ongoing process.
This theoretical perspective is considered here to be misguided
mainly in two respects. Firstly, it treats the peasantry as an
undifferentiated mass with no institutions of political, economic and
social organization beyond the boundary of the village. In my opinion, the
peasantry is neither an undifferentiated mass, nor is it composed of
discrete social units which are co-terminous with the village. Rather the
peasantry is characterized by distinct class boundaries. It is composed of
sets of institutions which extend critically beyond the village to include
the cities and ultimately the nature of the state.
Secondly, as Alavi (1973) shows, in the postcolonial societies
the relation between the landowning class and the native bourgeoisie is
different from that in the metropolitan countries at the time of the
bourgeois revolution. It is also true of a rural elite developed in a
minifundist agrarian context. In most of the postcolonial countries, the
native bourgeoisie is not confronted with the historical task of
subordinating the landowning class for the purpose of establishing the
nation-state. So, not only does the state mediate the interests of these
classes, there is furthermore an accomodation between them, as the dominant
landowning class complements the political purposes of the native
bourgeoisie in the running of the postcolonial state. It does this
because it plays a key role in establishing links between the state at the
national level and the local level power structures in the rural areas
which it dominates. Locally, it contains potentially revolutionary forces
and helps to maintain the "political equilibrium" of the overall national
system.
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This situation is even more obvious in case of Bangladesh, where
the fragile nature of the urban political leadership, the inability of the
urban elite to command independent resources and the limitations of
administrative capacity make the state apparatus more dependent on the
support of the rural elite.
Moreover, in a country numerically dominated by its peasantry,
the state cannot be regarded as a fixed or even prior entity in the process
of agrarian change. Structural change among the peasantry must inevitably
alter the complexion of the state. If resources are distributed among the
peasantry as part of the process of 'intervention' or 'penetration' by
state, then it is important to understand not only the impact of the
distribution but also why the state was associated with one pattern of
distribution and not another.
The institutions of the state are themselves the result of
political and economic forces, so the rulers of the state are likely to
defer to those forces in their al locative decisions. In this way the
institutions of the state cannot be opposed to the forces from which they
derive, and these forces exist in the village as well as elsewhere. Seen
in this way the notion of the state as being conceptually independent of the
political and economic forces which constitute it is fallacious. This
theoretical stance explains why the agricultural cooperative project,
sponsored by the state apparatus, has to rely upon the "natural" social
institutions rather than bringing new institutions and roles into being.
Bureaucratic Structure in the Rural Areas
Bangladesh, like many other capital-scarce, predominantly
agrarian countries, lacks the essential resources to support a large
bureaucratic structure. In other words, it is difficult to support an
overdeveloped bureaucratic apparatus superimposed over a subsistence
83
economy, with satisfactory renumeration. Lacking the preponderence of a
far-reaching and people-oriented ideology, which extends beyond
the immediate hopes and aspirations of the citizens, the natural
consequence is adoption of illegal means by the bureaucrats to generate
capital and wealth. This unwritten license for corruption is not confined
only in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy. Rather it has become
institutionalized and a fact of life among the lower level officers, such
as Tahshildars, Kanungos, Sub-divisional managers, and circle officer
(revenue)(Siddique,1981, p. 249).
This widespread corruption establishes a coalition between the
rural elite and bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has established crucial areas
of patronage through its monopoly over inputs and services to agriculture
and rural development. Furthermore, ministries and agencies internally
represent separate territories of patronage involving the reintroduction of
an informal market in which the difference between the subsidized price at
any level of distribution and the price at which the commodity or service
is really sold does not return as public revenue to the ministry or state
as a whole, but supplements individual incomes. In this proccess, classes
of rural clients are affected differently: the poor have no access at all,
while the rich pay for their access and have opportunities to pass on these
costs to others and extract a profit. Bureaucratic allocation has
certainly strengthened the position both of officials as well as the rural
elite, and in so doing contributes to the process of polarization and
differentiation in the countryside. The point is that the bureaucracy has
a vested interest in preserving the existing arrangenents for the
distribution and supply of scarce goods and services — the basis of both
mini-empires and the accumulation of wealth by some ('.lood, 1930, pp. 25-26).
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On top of distributing agricultural inputs and services, the
coalition between the rural elite and the bureaucracy is evident in the
functioning of the public works programs, which are supposed to provide
rural employment. The operation of these programs has been dominated by
the locally rich acting as brokers and contractors with government and
agencies seizing the opportunities for an extension of patronage and a new
form of economic diversification. This process is reinforced where no
prior organization of the rural workers has been involved in the programs,
and where funds are channeled through the local government bodies, which
are dominated by richer farmers and local enterpreneurs (Alamgir, 1977).
Local Government Bodies
Besides the bureaucratic structure, local governmental bodies
function as an institutionalized body to establish a liasion between the
state and the rich peasantry. The most organized post-British local Tgovern-
ment institution was created under the framework of the "basic democracy",
the controlled constitution process adopted by the then Pakistani President
Ayub Khan.
The union council was the lowest tier of the "basic democratic"
system. The union council in fact replaced the Union Boards which were set
up under the Local Self-government Act of 1919. "Union Parishad" was
established in independent Bangladesh in 1973 with similar composition
and functions. The Union Parishad has been vested with the powers of
taxation and is entitled to government aid and subsidy. It manages the
local affairs such as maintenance of peace and of Chaukidars (village
police). It also has to settle minor disputes in the village and
distribute food and such other essential commodities as sanctioned by the
government from time to time.
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Evidence suggests that there is a concentration of the rich
peasants in the local governmental bodies. Bertocci (1979, p. 40) found
that the dominant lineages also dominate the Union Parishad in Comilla. He
was referring to the Islampur Union Council of the Comilla district where
he found that out of 12 Muslim U.P. members, 9 were Sardars or from Sardari
lineages at the time of his research. In 1976, among the candidates for
Union Parishad membership in Kotwali Thana, Comilla district, 57.86 percent
came from the rich peasantry and 18.18 percent from the poor peasantry.
There was no candidate from the landless category (Solaiman & Alam, 1977,
p. 6). A recent survey conducted in 1981 of the Union Parishad leaders in
three districts in the Dhaka-Comilla belt shows that about 81.3 percent of
the Union Parishad leaders are from rich peasant background (Rob, 1979,
p. 119).
Economic Diversification
Economic diversification is another process through which the
rich peasant is integrated with the state. The conventional approach
to agricultural diversification does not seem to take account of the
possibility for richer peasants to prey on the misfortunes of others by
acquiring other forms of rural economic activity like noneylending. flor
does it take account of the enhanced capacity thereby gained to establish
sons in other forms of employment often with education as prior condition.
Evidence suggests that higher up the landholding range this
diversification becomes more evident with most of the rich peasant families
heavily engaged in off-holding economic activities. The issue of
diversification extends beyond additional income and its impact on the
immediate economic gain. If a family is involved in business, professional
activities or certain types of service occupations, then these provide
connections and access to the various resources and items of patronage
which are being distributed. Even the power to "lose a file" can be an
important asset, and one which is convertible into hard cash, a loan or a
fertilizer permit. Regular employment in the town naturally makes it
easier to petition officers and lobby officials. And since education and
literacy are highly correlated with business and professional activity
anyway, the access of this class to the resources and patronage of the
state is further enhanced. Such access does of course strengthen the
position of the class within the village, lending it superiority in a
variety of transactions in the courts, getting land registered, obtaining
credit and fertilizer at subsidized rates, getting licenses to trade, etc.
This relationship is also reflected in the recruitment of
political leaders from the village and the structure of political power
between the state and the countryside. By being intimate with urban based
enterpreneurs, the rich peasants become defacto agents of the state.
Relationship with the State Through Political Parties
Local political factions tend to polarize around the political
parties of the country through a number of "brokers" and thus get connected
to national political groupings. The functioning of the political parties
in the countryside is closely associated with the issue of factionalism,
discussed above. The factional leaders organize political groups out of
followers who are either economically dependent (laborers, sharecroooers,
and debtors) or who are obliged as a result of past favors and thus link
them to the national parties.
From the third decade of this century, political parties in this
region have been playing an important role in the rural political sphere.
This role became intensified when development plans cane into existence,
'low the state is the source of all critical resources. 3ut at the sane
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time the exercise of state power is intermittent, flow a representative
political system has developed with attendent military intervention, but
the people are not fully integrated in the system. Therefore, this system
calls for protection and the protection is furnished on a different plane
by the dominant/ruling political party (Lifschultz, 1979, Maniruzzaman,
1980). In terms of the rural areas, where resources are scarce, those
engaged in politics get both material and ideological gratification. The
situation is paradoxical. Parties have differnt ideologies, secularism and
socialism in the case of the Awami league, nationalism and Islam in the
case of the Nationalist Party or the newly formed Jonodal (People's Party).
Yet while in power, they all establish similar clientelist systems. In
exchange for the services which party activists render to the organization,
party leaders distribute favors of all sorts. This kind of process, in
turn, is accompanied by "deideolization" of the party engaged in political
competition.
The dependence of the political party leaders on the local
notables (Sardars and Hatabbars) is manifested in the latter's control over
votes. The rich landholders control the local votes in Bangladesh (Alavi,
1973, p. 157) and the political parties though their crucial role in the
decision making processes concerning resources like loans, fertilizer or
HYV seeds (Jahangir, 1932, p. 94). The notables thus link up their
supporters and the state resources in a way that reinforces their system of
domination.
ABSENCE OF PARTIES OF PROTEST
As I have shown, the state in Bangladesh is reflective of the
internal tensions and dialectics of the societal whole, of which the rural
sector is a significant part. The state mediates between the urban and
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rural dominant classes and thus patronizes the vertical mobilization
pattern. So the issue of restructuring agrarian development strategies
involves the issues of other social institutions as well.
The structure known as the political party performs the function
of interest articulation and aggregation in a given political system.
Parties stand at the juncture of social, economic and political relations
which connect the village to the wider world. I have mentioned that the
representative political parties in Bangladesh act to protect the existing
system. Now we turn to the question of the development of alternative
political party structures which can reflect the hopes and aspirations of
the rural poor and initiate a structural reorganization. As Wolf (1973)
maintains, peasants often harbor a deep sense of injustice but their sense
of injustice must be given shape and organization before it can become
politically articulated.
In a society, characterized by an extremely low literacy rate, it
is somewhat unrealistic to expect the rural poor to develop their own
political organization without the active help of sympathetic outsiders.
These outsiders are likely to come from an urban educated background and to
identify themselves with the rural poor's cause either from a sense of
intellectual commitment, or from a realization of their material and moral
insecurity in a rapidly polarizing society.
Despite a reasonably long tradition of political activism, the
alternative political party structures have not prospered in Sangladesn. A
close look at the growth of some of the political organizations, who have
formally been committed to a non-exploitative political arrangement, will
bear out ny statement.
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Communist Party (1919-1953)
Although a number of peasant movements took place under the
leadership of the Communist party cadres in the British colonial period
(Mukul, 1983, pp. 147-153), the movements were mostly concentrated in the
northern districts. The Dhaka-Comi 11a belt was almost untouched by
militant peasant activities. The fact that the northern districts were the
focal points of the movements can be explained by the existence of big
landlordism and a more visibly unequal distribution pattern in that region.
The Communist party suffered a severe setback in the South Asian
subcontinent immediately after 1947. Under the influence of the ultra-left
line pursued by Ranadive, the Communist Party of India called for an
immediate socialist revolution aimed at overthrowing the bourgeois
government. The result was a total disaster. Lacking sufficient
organizational growth and following among the people who were still
convinced that the independence was brought for the betterment of the
general mass, the Communist Party underwent a severe repression from the
authorities. Hundreds of leaders and cadres were imprisoned, their
properties were confiscated and mass organizations were destroyed (Masud,
1974). The East Pakistan Communist Party, which followed the policies of
their Indian counterpart, suffered the same destiny. Moreover, the
Communist Party was outlawed in Pakistan, both East and West. (Haque, 1975,
pp. 61). In 1950, the ultra-left Ranadive line was abandoned by the
Communist Party.
Badarauddin Umar has pointed out several reasons for the failure
of the early Marxists to have an effective base among the people ("mar,
1981). First, most of the early Marxists in Bengal came from a terrorist
background. Although disillusionment over a method of struggle led them to
join the Communist Party, it was not easy for them to get rid of the
90
psychological structure formed by terrorist practices. One of the
essential aspects of terrorist thought and action is isolation from people
and as Umar argues this method has proved a failure in several different
countries. Secondly, most of the Marxist leaders since the 1930's came
from landowners or petit-bourgeois background. Many of them couldn't shake
off the influence of their class origin even after a long time involvement
with radical political movement.
Finally, Umar attributes the responsibility of the failure of
these early Marxists to a demographic fact. Till the 1950's most of the
Marxist leaders came from a Hindu background. Since Islam is a crucial
element in the dominant ideology of the East Bengali peasants, the
religious identity of the Marxist leaders stood in the way of an effective
communication between them and the peasants.
After abandoning the ultra-left political line the Marxists
decided to form a legitimate, broad-based multi-classed democratic party
and use it as their own platform. As a result, the "Gonotontri Dal"
(Democratic Party) was formed in 1953 (Umar, 1981, pp. 61). the new party,
however, was never able to establish a strong organizational base.
Awami League
Besides the Communists, there was another group which attempted
to work among the poor peasantry with some success. There '.vere, fron the
outset, two traditions in the Eengali nationalist '!ovenent and its
pioneering party Awami League: (1) A petit-bourgeosis alitist traction r'or
those who hoped to rise to senior positions in the bureaucracy or to become
members of the newly created business community in bengal on the strength
of governmental financial support and subsidy; and (2) a rural populist
tradition that articulated the frustrations and aspirations of the long
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suffering sections of the extremely poor Bengal peasantry. The two
traditions were interwined but remained distinct (Alavi, 1973, pp. 167).
In the early 1950's the Bengali Language Movement embraced both
traditions. At the head of the elitist faction of the Awami League was
H.S. Suhrawardy. As Prime Minister of Pakistan he was an ardent supporter
of Western powers. He vigorously supported the Anglo-French-Israeli
intervention against Egypt at Suez as well as the United States alliance
with Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman was a protege of Suhrawardy and was
schooled by him in politics. His political commitments were firmly with
the elitist group (Ibid, p. 168).
On the other hand, the populist tradition flourished under the
umbrella of Maulana Bhashani. The elitist leadership was largely
concentrated in the towns and cities. The populists had large number of
cadres among the middle, poor and landless peasants in the villages. Since
the Gonatantrik Dal did not have significant success in mobilizing people,
the East Pakistan Communist Party , in its 1956 conference in Calcutta,
decided to work within the frame work of the Awami League (Umar, 1933,
p. 62).
fJational Awami Party
In February 1957, at the conference of the Awami League at
Kagmari, the conflict between the elitist leadership and the populist
cadres was brought to a head on the issue of Prime Minister Suhrawardy's
pro-western foreign policy. This led to a break and to the ouster of the
* Although the Communist Party was outlawed, it maintained its clandestine
organizational structure. It held its conference in Calcutta, '..'est Bengal,
because legally it was not oossible for them to run any ooen political
activity in Pakistan.
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populists, who later formed the National Awami Party (Alavi, 1973, p.
168). The populist cadres, however, failed to rally their traditional
rural supporters behind the new party. It is crucial to the understanding
of the Awami League that, although its populist cadres were eliminated,
its mass populist base among the rural people remained.
Two factors were important in the retention of the party's hold
over the masses. First, the populist tradition, despite its strong poor
peasant orientation, was never able to replace the factional mode of
politics in the rural areas. Although the populist cadres organized a
base among the middle, poor and landless peasants, they never initiated a
process to politicize these social strata. Instead, they made compromises
with the existing mode, either by including the existing factions within
the party organization or by creating new factions. The Communists also
could not make much progress, mostly because the Awami League was divided
after only one year of their membership in the party. The populists had
political appeal among the unpoliticized peasantry as long as they
functioned under the auspices of the Awami league. But when the
polarization resulted in the division of the party, the pro Awami League
factional leaders did not want to run the risk of severing their
organizational ties with the elitist tradition (Haque, 1975, p. 177).
Secondly, Sheikh Mujib's role as an individual is also important.
Notwithstanding his firm commitment to the elitist group, his rhetoric and
his personal style of life were populist in charcter. He was a nan with
whom the people could identify. Besides the factional node of politics,
"he bridged the gap between the elitist leadership of the Awami League and
its mass populist base," (Alavi, 1973, p. 153). Thus, by a mistimed and
badly managed precipitation of the party crisis, it was the populist cadres
who were isolated from the political mainstream.
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The large farmer bias of the dominant political parties is still
a conspicuous phenomenon in the political panorama of Bangladesh. The
macro structures of the political parties are closely related to the micro
community structures through the rural nexus groups. The policies and the
actions of the dominant national political parties, in the final analysis,
are geared to protect and perpetuate the existing vertical mobilization
pattern in the rural peripheries. Thus, programs of 'reform' and 'change',
in most of the cases, are little more than lip service. The left wing parties,
who have a pronounced goal to bring about fundamental transformation in the
structural relationships, either have few resources, or when they do, are
integrated to the existing system.
The poor peasant agriculturalists in the Dhaka-Comilla belt (and rural
Bangladesh in general )are thus locked in a vertical mode of structural
relationships. In a society where kinship networks and traditional organi-
zations with territorial dimension are still overwhelmingly significant
frames of reference, factionalism and clientelism are the predominant pattern of
politics, a new horizontal ideology has yet to develop, the state apparatus has
an obvious bias toward the elite and the political parties either identify
themselves with the existing system or lack adequate resources to bring about a
breakthrough, the problem of rural development has to be addressed with much
caution. Individual effort, micro level participation or macro level policy
formulation, none of these is adequate to buildup an effective, rural poor
oriented development strategy. A more holistic approach, which is committed to
combine all these elements is required in order to bring about a qualitative
change in the lives of the rural poor.
CHAPTER VI 9 4
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The central theme on which the present work has been developed is
that the problem of development strategy cannot be considered in isolation,
for it is interwined with a complex milieu of the political, social,
economic and cultural factors. A close look at the working of the
Comilla Cooperative M°del in the stratified peasant society of the
Dhaka-Comilla belt bears out this thesis.
Although a flexible caste and class structure and an embryonic market
economy existed in Muslim Bengal in the pre-colonial period, class differen-
tiation in an institutional form is a result of colonial intrusion.
Institutionalized landlordism, patronized by the British colonial government
added a new dimension to the class arrangement in this region. Periodi-
cally during the nineteenth century, the British authority intervened
to establish regulations designed to make revisions in the landowning
relationship. Most significant among these was the Bengal Tenancy Act
of 1885 which gave dejure recognition to the rights of others besides
the landlords in the agrarian hierarchy. Though the Bengal Tenancy Act
was many times amended after 1885, it was seldom implemented' rigorously on
behalf of weaker sections of the cultivating peasantry. In 1950, when
big landlordism (zamindari) was abolished in East Bengal and the land-
lords, who were mostly Hindu by religion, left for India, the rich
peasants occupied the power vacuum.
Comilla Cooperative Model is among the series of rural development
strategies, formulated and implemented by the colonial and post-colonial
governments. One can discern a common agenda in these programs—developing
the countryside without restructuring the existing structural relationships.
Furthermore, the Commilla Cooperative Model was an immediate result of the
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process of revisioniny the community development approach which was basically
contrived as an alternative to the marxist model of wealth and income redis-
tribution.
The Academy for Rural Develooment at Com Ha. has been originating
and experimenting with programs since its founding in 1959 as the government's
field training and research station for rural develooment in East "akistan
(and after 1971 Bangladesh). At the outset, the Academy had considerable success
in introducing new production technolonies, mobilizinn rural credit and
including the small farmers in the develoomental oraani zations. The effort to
raise rice production through supolying credit, inouts and extension education
did guite well, and yields went up substatially.
Initially, the membership of the agricultural cooperatives were madeup
almost wholly of the smaller and middle-sized farmers. The larger farmers
leased out their lands and often were moneylenders and so had little or
no interest in becoming members of the local cooperative society. However,
as the program expanded, things changed. Once the advantages of cooperation
tied to access to irrigation facilities and new seed varieties become
widely perceived, the benefits of development were coopted by the traditionally
dominant elements of the local villages. By the early seventies, most of the
cooperative societies were dominated by the better off farmers.
Although I noticed grievances and discontents among the poor peasants and
landless laborers, over rich peasants domination, there is no organized protest
against it. As one sociologist puts it— "wiaespread protest is still i distant
cry in rural Bangladesh" (Jahangir 1981 p. 97). The central question '. nave
attempted to answer in this thesis are (i) How are the rich oeasants able to
to maintain their domination? (ii) Why
, s this domination not invokin" wide-
spread agrarian protest? In other words, why are rich peasants and landless
laborers, "the class in itself" not being transformed to "the class for
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itself"? My theoretical, thus methodological stance to answer these
questions is to explore the broad structural processes in the countryside.
Here I have connected the micro level problem of rural cooperative
with the macro level problem of broad social structure. In this case, the
micro level is closely intertextured with the macro level, and the macro
level, as a superior issue, influences the subordinate issue, that is the
micro level. The structural processes I discussed here are:
(i) the kinship network;
(ii ) the territorial socio-political organization;
(iii) the factional mode of politics;
(iv) the structure of ideological domination;
(v) the bias of the state apparatus to the
dominant rural classes.
These processes combinely to create and reinforce the oattern of
vertical mobilization in rural Bangladesh. I have sunoested an alternative
mobilization to substitute the existinq one, in order to ensure the
rural poor's effective participation in the develonmental activities. The
problem of establishing a horizontal mobilization is closely relajed to the
problem of a qualitative reconfiguration of the existing socio-political-
economic systems. The exploitative relationships in the rural societies
in the Dhaka-Comi 1 la belt involve the state, the way in which it favors the
classes which are responsible for inequality, poverty and lack of growth is
obvious. Likewise, if present problems produce consciousness and discontent
among the rural poor and dispossessed, we cannot innore the pressure
which they may bring to bear on government for the potential for their
unity to overturn the present structure of political and economic oower
and reconstitute the state in their own favor. The problem of transform no
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the nature of the state apparatus is closely related to the importance of a
political organization, which can aggregate and articulate the frustrations
and aspirations of the rural poor, and connect their demands to the
structural transformation of the wider society. But such an organization is
absent in present Bangladesh. So the sixth process which makes rich peasant's
domination possible is (vi) absence of a political party which can carry the
demands of the rural poor to a logical consequence.
We can thus conclude that unless a pattern of loyalty can be extended
beyond the parochial social units (bari, reyai), unless the factional mode of
power can be supplanted by a constructive integration of the poor peasants
and landless laborers, unless a new ideology of distribution, right and human
dignity can prevail; unless a system can be established in the national arena,
which will actively formulate and implement policies in the interests of the
rural and urban marginal classes; and finally unless an effective political
party can be brought into existence to attain the aforementioned aims, any
development strategy will continue to serve the vested, established interests.
The nature of the problem of rich peasants domination over cooperatives,
is more complex than it is usually conceived by many researchers. In the
cooperatives, the poor peasants and landless laborers might remain weak, even
if the rich peasants are excluded, precisely because of their subordinate position
in other structures of dependence which constitute the greater part of their
lives
.
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The central theme on which the present thesis is developed is
that the problem of the development strategy cannot be considerd in isolation,
for it is interwined with a complex milieu of the political, social, economic,
and cultural factors. A close look at the working of the Comilla Cooperative
Model in the stratified peasant society in Bangladesh provides support to
this theme.
Comilla Cooperative Model, although initially aimed at the middle and
small strata of the rural peasantry, was finally taken over by the rich
farmers. Although I noticed grievances and discontents among the poor
peasants and landless laborers over the rich peasants' domination in
the cooperatives, there is no organized protest against this. Against this
backdrop, the central questions I have attempted to answer in this thesis
are (i) How are the rich peasants able to maintain their domination?
(ii) Why is this domination not invoking widespread agrarian protest?
My theoretical, thus methodological stance to answer these questions
is to explore the broad structural processes in the countryside. The struc-
tural processes I discussed are:
i) the kinship network;
ii) the territorial socio-political organization;
iii) the factional mode of politics;
iv) the structure of ideological domination;
j) the bias of the state apparatus to the dominant
rural classes:
(vi) absence of an effective political party which can
carry the hopes and aspirations of the rural poor to
a logical consequence.
'
